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ESSAY
THE CURRICULUM OF THE CARCERAL STATE
Alice Ristroph*
This Essay scrutinizes the canons of substantive criminal law, with
a particular focus on the curricular canon. By curricular canon, I mean
the conceptual model used to teach the subject of criminal law, including
the cases, narratives, and ideas that are presented to students. Since the
middle of the twentieth century, American law schools have offered (and
often required) a course in criminal law in which homicide is the para-
digm crime and legality is a core organizing principle. The curricular
canon depicts criminal law as a necessary and race-neutral response to
grave injuries, and it also depicts criminal law as capable of self-restraint
through various internal limiting principles. This model does not
correspond closely to actual legal practices, and it never did; it was
designed to model what criminal law could become. Though this
curricular model was developed by men who wanted to improve and
constrain the criminal law, instead it probably contributed to the vast
expansion of criminal interventions in the second half of the twentieth
century. The Essay reveals the pro-carceral implications of the prevailing
canon, and it offers the outline of a different model that could alter
American attitudes toward criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, as the American criminal system grew and its racial
disparities became impossible to ignore, many have resisted the suggestion
that the scale or demographics of the prison population indicate some-
thing fundamentally rotten in criminal law itself. For example, former
prosecutor and FBI Director James Comey told then-President Obama that
the term "mass incarceration" was inaccurate and insulting.1 To Comey,
the term was inaccurate because each defendant was treated as an individ-
ual, "charged individually, represented individually by counsel, convicted
by a court individually, sentenced individually, reviewed on appeal
individually, and incarcerated. That added up to a lot of people injail, but
there was nothing 'mass' about it." And the term was insulting, because it
"cast as illegitimate the efforts by cops, agents, and prosecutors-joined by
the black community-to rescue hard-hit neighborhoods."2
As informed readers were quick to note, Comey's argument obscured
multiple well-documented realities: prosecutors' broad power to select
who will become a criminal, overburdened and underfunded indigent
defense counsel who can do very little to alter their clients' fates,' the fact
that almost all convictions are based on guilty pleas rather than a factual
1. James Comey, A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies, and Leadership 150 (2018).
2. See id.
3. See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1225, 1233 (2016) ("Unrestrained charging discretion combined with broad crimi-
nal codes and power to define sentencing differentials are the sources of prosecutorial
power and leverage in plea bargaining.").
4. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a
National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006) (noting that many defendants do not
have access to adequate representation because of underfunding and other problems); Paul
D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176, 2178
(2013) (arguing that while indigent defense is underfunded, even good lawyers cannot save
poor people from a system that is designed to incarcerate them).
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determination by ajudge orjury,' the circumstances that make these pleas
less than "voluntary,"6 the prevalence of mandatory minimums and other
mechanized determinations of sentences,7 and the limited efficacy of
appellate review.8 Obama himself may have pointed out some of these
realities to Comey, and Comey acknowledges that after the conversation,
"I was smarter."9
But in at least one respect, Comey's original formulation captured
something important about the vast expansion of criminal interventions
now labeled mass incarceration. Individual law enforcers such as Comey
himself-"cops, agents, and prosecutors"-had to decide to pursue each
of the millions of criminal convictions necessary to imprison nearly one
percent of adult Americans. Mass incarceration, or "a lot of people in
jail," is about individuals, in that it requires a great many individuals who
are willing to put a still larger number of other individuals behind bars.
The passage from Comey's memoir suggests a reason that so many state
officials were willing to pursue convictions and prison sentences: They saw
their work as a worthy effort to "rescue hard-hit neighborhoods" and
otherwise improve social well-being, and importantly, they saw this work as
a law-bound, legitimate effort." In the minds of the human agents of the
5. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma:
An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1, 7 (2013) (noting that almost ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are
based on guilty pleas). In state courts, about ninety-four percent of felony convictions are
based on guilty pleas. See Bureau of Just. Stats., Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006-
Statistical Tables 25 tbl.4.1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XER9-ZB2V].
6. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 5, at 36-37 (discussing an empirical study of
circumstances in which innocent defendants plead guilty to obtain a sentencing benefit);
see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent De-
fendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 157, 161-62 (2014) (listing features of the
American criminal legal system that create "hydraulic pressure" and increase the likelihood
that innocent defendants will nonetheless plead guilty).
7. See Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 Geo. L.J. 1245, 1266-69 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Peter Maass,James Comey Told Barack Obama that His Use of the Phrase
"Mass Incarceration" Was Insulting to Law Enforcement Officers, Intercept (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/04/ 18/ames-comey-sees-himself-as-a-victim-of-trump-he-
refuses-to-see-the-victims-of-the-justice-system [https://perma.cc/BSD3-J62P] ("[0]nly the
well-off or the fortunate who obtain lawyers with the resources and the time for aggressive
litigation can pursue appeals that have a decent change of overturning a bad verdict.").
9. Comey, supra note 1, at 151; see also Barack Obama, The President's Role in
Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 824-29 (2017) (discussing
federal charging practices and prosecutors' leverage during plea negotiations, made
possible by severe sentencing laws); id. at 855 (discussing the need for sentencing reform at
the state level).
10. See Katherine Beckett, Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 Contemp. Socio.
11, 11 (2018) (noting that the U.S. incarceration rate reached almost one in one hundred
in 2007, and also noting increases in the number of persons on probation or parole, booked
in jail, or living with a criminal record).
11. See Comey, supra note 1, at 150.
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carceral state, law-rather than raw power or discretion-defines what is
criminal, and the due process of law ensures the fair treatment of each
individual defendant. To get to mass incarceration, we needed a way of
thinking about criminal law that would mean that in each individual
case-for millions of individual cases-prosecution and punishment
seemed like a good idea.
This Essay is about the relationship between individual actions and
aggregate phenomena, and the relationship between ideas and practices.
It explores a particular understanding of criminal law that gives meaning
and legitimacy to the extensive work that mass incarceration requires. This
model posits criminal law as a necessary response to deeply harmful and
wrongful actions. The model recognizes the substantial burden of criminal
interventions but holds that such interventions occur only within the
bounds of carefully drawn legal constraints, such as a stringent burden of
proof.12 Importantly, the model envisions criminal law as neutral and
egalitarian, imposing its burdens without reference to race, class, or
gender. Many aspects of this model bear little relation to actual legal
practices-hence the criticism from Comey's most knowledgeable readers.
But as a mindset and normative ideal, the model is nonetheless familiar. It
is the canonical account that American legal education has delivered to
students for several decades through a course in "substantive criminal
law," usually as part of the required first-year curriculum. Nearly every
lawyer in the country, and thus nearly every prosecutor, defense attorney,
and judge, has been taught hese basic canons of criminal law: Defendants
are initially presumed innocent; criminal charges must be based on a clear
and preexisting statute; the state bears the burden of proving violation of
said statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, future lawyers are
taught that crime definitions follow a certain logical structure: mens rea
(mental state) plus actus reus (action). And they are taught that the
specific acts defined as criminal-the substance of criminal law-are those
that inflict grave injuries upon individuals and society at large. In the
American legal curriculum, homicide is the paradigm crime: a terrible act
that demands punishment, but punishment by law, imposed only after
careful investigation, application of the right legal definitions,
presentation of adequate evidence concerning both act and mental state,
and in most cases, appellate review.13
This set of claims is so familiar to American lawyers that one may
forget, as Comey apparently did, that the model does not describe present
practices. Even once the gaps between the curricular framework and
12. I have used the phrase "criminal law exceptionalism" to describe this model, since
it combines the claim that criminal law imposes exceptional burdens with the claim that
criminal law addresses exceptionally harmful or wrongful conduct and operates through
exceptionally careful procedures. See Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incar-
ceration, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 1949, 1952-54 (2019) [hereinafter Ristroph, Intellectual History];
see also infra Part I.
13. See infra section II.C.
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actual practice are pointed out, it may be tempting to conclude that the
canonical model of criminal law was once roughly accurate, and then
somehow, practices veered off-course and criminal law went "off the
rails."" That suggestion works only so long as we don't actually study
history. If we do look closely at criminal law's past, it becomes clear that
the curricular model of criminal law never described actual practices.
Criminal law in America has always been rife with discretion, has always
reached non-injurious and often petty conduct, and has rarely demanded
rigorous proof before ajury or offered extensive appellate review.1 5
The canonical model is not a portrait of a lost past, but rather a
normative vision that was developed in the mid-twentieth century as part
of an effort to win respect for criminal law within legal academia." The
founders of the criminal law canon had broader goals as well: They
worried about the irrationalities and overreach of criminal law, and they
hoped to develop the model of an ideal criminal code. Indeed, Herbert
Wechsler, one of the primary architects of the framework that still struc-
tures substantive criminal law courses, was also the primary architect of the
Model Penal Code (MPC).17 A noted scholar of constitutional law as well
as a criminal law expert, Wechsler was a champion of "neutral principles,"
albeit with a specific conception of neutrality.18 The canons of substantive
criminal law, as developed by Wechsler and his contemporaries and as
tweaked by later scholars, are purportedly color-blind, depicting an egali-
tarian system that imposes obligations without reference to race. Of
course, American criminal law is today rife with racial disparities, which
brings us again to this Essay's inquiry into the relationship between ideas
and practices. What is the relationship between our curricular model and
our present criminal law reality? Did scholars articulate a noble vision that
policymakers and practitioners simply ignored? Or did the vision of
substantive criminal law crafted at midcentury help enable the racialized
expansion of American criminal law?
I suggest that American law schools, through the required course on
substantive criminal law, have contributed affirmatively to the collection
of phenomena commonly labeled mass incarceration.19 They do so by
14. WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Collapse of American CriminalJustice 5 (2011) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Collapse].
15. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1956-71 (providing an over-
view of the breadth of criminal law, scope of enforcement discretion, and rarity ofjury trials
throughout American history).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 29-34 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles] (expressing concern that
some of the Supreme Court's racial equality opinions, including Shelley v. Kraemer and Brown
v. Board of Education, were not adequately supported by "neutral principles").
19. Two questions have arisen about the term "mass incarceration," one about prison
and one about race. The term first became widely used among criminal law specialists to
refer to the exponential growth in American prisoners-those actually held in custody in jail
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telling a particular story about criminal law as limited in scope, careful in
its operation, and uniquely morally necessary. The story has always been
fiction, but it is presented as fact. Students educated in this model learn to
trust and embrace criminal law, and thus law schools have helped to facilitate
a carceral state by supplying it with willing agents, and more specifically,
willing lawyers. Importantly, law schools have continued to tell basically
the same story even as American prison populations exploded and racial
disparities in that population became impossible to ignore.20 Curricular
attempts to address racialized mass incarceration have been additive
rather than transformational, by which I mean academics have sought to
supplement he traditional canon rather than reexamine it.2 1 At best, this
approach has been ineffective, failing to counter the pro-carceral themes
that are embedded in most of the traditional material. At worst, the
additive approach could be affirmatively harmful: By mentioning racial
disparities among those convicted and punished, while simultaneously
emphasizing the legitimacy and neutrality of substantive criminal law, law
schools may inadvertently reinforce conceptions of Black criminality.
My aim is not to provide an overarching account of mass incarceration. It
is a complex social and political phenomenon, and its causes and necessary
conditions are many and difficult to untangle. I want simply to highlight
one piece of the puzzle that has so far received relatively little attention.
Mass incarceration is also a legal phenomenon, and the role of the legal
profession needs scrutiny. Unless we are to characterize the legal profession as
or prison-in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Increasingly, however,
commentators have emphasized the expansion of criminal law in many forms, including
tremendous growth in the number of persons with convictions who are not necessarily held
in jail or prison but who are subject to other legal burdens. See Michelle Alexander, The
New Jim Crow 15-16 (10th anniversary ed. 2020) (defining mass incarceration to include
not only the entire criminal justice system but also "the larger web of laws, rules, policies,
and customs that control those labeled criminals both in and out of prison"). Another ques-
tion concerns how to distinguish between the overall expansion of criminal interventions,
which has increased convictions across all racial groups-albeit at varying rates-and the
specific impact on persons of color, especially Black Americans. Some have argued that the
term "hyper-incarceration" better captures the racialized aspect of the increase in prisoners
and convictions. See, e.g., Loic Wacquant, Forum, in Race, Incarceration, and American
Values 57, 59 (Glenn C. Loury ed., 2008). This Essay seeks to analyze, but also to keep
distinct, all of these phenomena-the overall expansion of the prison population, the
overall expansion of non-custodial interventions, and the significant racial disparities that
have characterized both expansions.
20. The American prison population began to grow significantly in the 1970s, but wide-
spread recognition of "mass incarceration" did not occur until the early 2000s. See Marie
Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics 1, 16 fig.1.3
(2015) [hereinafter Gottschalk, The Prison State] (showing incarceration rates over time
and noting that fifteen years before the book's publication, "mass imprisonment was largely
an invisible issue"). Racial disparities in the prison population were present throughout the
expansion but worsened over time. See Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect-Race, Crime, and
Punishment in America 28-29 (1995) (providing statistics on racial disparities and noting
that the disparities have increased over time).
21. See infra section IID.
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unthinking or malevolent, we need an account of why so many lawyers
have chosen and still choose to pursue convictions and prison sentences
on such a massive scale. This Essay explores that question and suggests that
law schools bear more responsibility for mass incarceration than we have
so far acknowledged. Recognizing this responsibility makes evident the
likely costs of complacency: By continuing to rely on the same canonical
model of criminal law, we are likely to preserve the carceral state.
To develop this argument, I scrutinize the canons of criminal law, with
a particular focus on what I will call the curricular canon.22 I use this phrase
to refer to the conceptual model used to teach criminal law, including the
principal claims and narratives that are used to explain the field.23
Elsewhere, I have begun to develop a broader intellectual history of mass
incarceration, one that addresses legal education but extends beyond it."
But a more focused and detailed analysis of teaching materials seems
especially urgent now. First, the May 2020 killing of George Floyd by police
officers25 has invigorated movements for both criminal law reform and ra-
cial justice more broadly, and these movements are rightfully challenging
the presumption of legitimacy that criminal law and law enforcement have
long enjoyed.26 At this moment, more than ever, we need an honest
account of criminal law and an accurate understanding of the sources of
its racial disparities. Second, the disruptions to legal education caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic create challenges for law faculty, but also oppor-
tunities. A shift to greater reliance on online resources or remote teaching
means that many law schools are now developing the next generation of
22. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 963, 975 (1998) (" [W]e may find a wide divergence between what professors of law
teach and what they write about."); cf. id. at 975-76 (distinguishing between the "pedagog-
ical canon," the "cultural literacy canon," and the "academic theory canon," and noting
that for constitutional law the content of each may be slightly different).
23. Jill Hasday's definition, from her work on the family law canon, is helpful: "By
'canon,' I mean the dominant narratives, stories, examples, and ideas that judges, lawmak-
ers, and (to a less crucial extent) commentators repeatedly invoke to describe and explain
family law and its governing principles." Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law Reimagined 2
(2014).
24. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1952 ("[T]o figure out where
we might want criminal law to go, we need a better understanding of where we have been
and where we are now.").
25. See Jordan Culver, What We Know About the Death of George Floyd: 4
Minneapolis Police Officers Fired After 'Horrifying' Video Hits Social Media, USA Today
(May 26, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/26/george-floyd-
minneapolis-police-officers-fired-after-public-backlash/5263193002 [https://perma.cc/E3
XX-TXPA] (last updated May 27, 2020).
26. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. Times
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-
defund-police.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[M]any cannot imagine any-
thing other than prisons and the police as solutions to violence and harm. People like me
who want to abolish prisons and police, however, have a vision of a different society, built
on cooperation instead of individualism, on mutual aid instead of self-preservation.").
16372020]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
teaching materials.27 Overwhelmed by unavoidable changes in the form of
the course, some ducators are likely to be averse to rethinking substance.
But to reproduce the same pro-carceral criminal law curriculum in a new
medium would be to entrench the carceral state, and its inequalities, still
further. The pandemic has highlighted and magnified inequalities;28 it
also creates an opportunity for legal academics to revisit and revise their
own participation in the perpetuation of inequality.
My argument focuses on the content of the course and is fairly agnos-
tic among teaching methods.29 But with regard to both teaching method
and curricular content, American legal education has been notoriously
path-dependent and hard to change since the late nineteenth century.30 It
is also better designed to reproduce hierarchies, or ideologies, than to
challenge them.31 Some teachers and scholars of criminal law will resist the
suggestion that the academic depiction of substantive criminal law is
deeply flawed. If I cannot persuade these thinkers to change their minds,
I can at least issue them a clear challenge. Given the gaps between criminal
law's actual operation and its curricular representation, those who defend
or continue to use the existing curriculum need to justify their model.32 It
is probably impossible for education to be neutral, but that is all the more
reason to try to identify and scrutinize the particular ideologies that shape
teachers' choices.
The structure of this Essay follows my dual aims to destabilize the
current curricular model and to move toward something better. Part I
27. See Nina A. Kohn, Teaching Law Online: A Guide for Faculty, 69 J. Legal Educ.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648536 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) ("[T]he educational crisis precipitated by the COVID-19 pan-
demic has presented an opportunity for academics to rethink how they teach and to
experiment with new teaching techniques that may be better suited to achieving desired
learning outcomes.").
28. See, e.g., Richard A. OppelJr., Robert Gebeloff, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright &
Mitch Smith, The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. Times (July 5,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-
americans-cdc-data.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (illustrating the effects of
COVID-19 on different racial groups).
29. That said, some course content is driven by the "case method," as section II.B
discusses.
30. See, e.g., Elliott E. Cheatham, Legal Education-Some Predictions, 26 Tex. L. Rev.
174, 180 (1947) ("[L]egal education has made no comparable progress. We are, for the
most part, adhering in 1947 to a method first developed over seventy years ago."); see also
Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60 Vand.
L. Rev. 609, 613-15 (2007) ("Nearly one hundred years have passed since 1914, of course,
and we still rely on Langdell's substantive innovations.").
31. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32J.
Legal Educ. 591, 591 (1982) (claiming that law schools provide "ideological training for
willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state").
32. And in particular, teachers who are also scholars should ask whether they depict
criminal law differently in their scholarship and in their classrooms, and, if so, why.
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begins the work of destabilization with a short history of American crim-
inal law teaching. Two claims are key here: First, the vision of "substantive
criminal law" now promulgated to most first-year law students was
developed about eighty years ago as part of an effort to win more respect
for criminal law in the academy and in the profession. Second, this vision
was a normative one that never corresponded very closely to actual legal
practices. Part II examines the content of contemporary first-year criminal
law courses in more detail to identify several subtly pro-carceral messages
that inculcate a view of criminal law as morally and practically necessary,
fair and color-blind, and disciplined by internal limiting principles. Part
III asks whether curriculum matters and offers reasons to think that the
way we teach criminal law does affect legal practice, though not necessarily
in the ways that teachers intend. Part IV outlines a different explanatory
model of the laws that define conduct, and people, as criminal. It is only
an outline; developing a new paradigm requires more space than one
Essay affords.33 But the project must be launched. A different criminal law
canon will enable professors to teach a more realistic course, one that
better depicts the actual operation of criminal law and one that leaves
students better equipped to reject carceral ideology if they so choose. And
beyond the classroom, both in and beyond the legal profession, a better
understanding of criminal law may enable real change in American penal
practices. Toward that end, a Conclusion offers a few thoughts on the
relationship between legal thought and legal practices.
33. A new curricular paradigm for criminal law is also likely to be a collective project
rather than a solo endeavor. In the hope of contributing to a collective rethinking, I have
developed various aspects of an alternative account in several earlier works. See Alice
Ristroph, Criminal Law as Public Ordering, 70 U. Toronto L.J. 64, 64 (2020) (recon-
ceptualizing order in the criminal law paradigm as an ongoing activity to provide leverage
for critiques of criminal law practices); Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law for Humans, in Hobbes
and the Law 97, 117 (David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole eds., 2012) [hereinafter Ristroph,
Criminal Law for Humans] (emphasizing criminal law as a human practice); Alice Ristroph,
The Definitive Article, 68 U. Toronto L.J. 140, 140 (2018) [hereinafter Ristroph, Definitive
Article] (exploring the contingent, constructed character of criminal law, and critiquing
efforts to draw a sharp line between substantive and procedural criminal law); Ristroph,
Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 2009-10 ("The everyday work of criminal law is a series
of enforcement decisions . . . and the outcomes of these decisions are often unpredict-
able."); Alice Ristroph, Responsibility for the Criminal Law, in Philosophical Foundations
of Criminal Law 107, 109 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) [hereinafter Ristroph,
Responsibility for the Criminal Law] ("The claim is that the state designated this act as a
crime and chose to prosecute and punish it. For these public acts, there is collective respon-
sibility. That responsibility should be part and parcel of any theory of criminal responsibil-
ity."); Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 305, 306 (2018) [hereinafter Ristroph, Thin Blue Line] (contending that a




I. THE INVENTION OF THE "SUBSTANTIVE" CRIMINAL LAW (COURSE)
Criminal law has a history, though that history is often obscured or
forgotten.34 The course on "substantive criminal law" that is now required
by almost every American law school also has a history, and a brief review
of that history may help explain the content and ideological orientation
of the contemporary curriculum.35 Two points deserve emphasis: The
substantive criminal law course now required in most American law
schools follows a model developed in the mid-twentieth century as part of
academics' efforts to win more respect for their field, and this course was
from its inception a normative model of criminal law rather than an
accurate description of existing institutions.
A. The Quest for Respect
When law emerged as an academic and intellectual discipline in the
nineteenth century in the United States, criminal law almost got left
behind. Christopher Columbus Langdell and others championed a view
of law as a science, worthy of scholarly inquiry, university training, and
eventually, separate professional schools.36 But Langdell and his contem-
poraries focused almost exclusively on the fields now classified as "private
34. See Alice Ristroph, What Is Remembered, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 1157, 1157 (2020)
[hereinafter Ristroph, What Is Remembered] (reviewing Sarah A. Seo, Policing the Open
Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom (2019) [hereinafter Seo, Policing the
Open Road]).
35. I am grateful to Anders Walker both for his article on the history of American
criminal law teaching and for the illuminating responses that his article provoked. See
Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the
Criminal Law Course, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 217, 219-20 (2009) [hereinafter Walker, The
Anti-Case Method]; see also Donald A. Dripps, On Cases, Casebooks, and the Real World of
CriminalJustice: A Brief Response to Anders Walker, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 257, 259 (2009)
[hereinafter Dripps, Brief Response]; Angela P. Harris & Cynthia Lee, Teaching Criminal
Law from a Critical Perspective, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 261, 261 (2009) [hereinafter Harris
& Lee, Teaching Criminal Law]; Yale Kamisar, I Remember Professor Wechsler, 7 Ohio St.
J. Crim. L. 249, 249 (2009); Lloyd Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
279, 279 (2009) [hereinafter Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law]. But as will become clear,
my concerns with the course are quite different from Walker's. He identifies and decries a
departure from a Langdellian style of case-based teaching, suggesting that a return to
Langdell's model would better prepare students for practice. Preparing students for
practice, while important, is not my central concern here. The problem is not the legal skills
the course does or doesn't teach, but the way the course teaches students to think about
criminal law. It teaches them to think like carceralists, one might say.
36. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1983)
(noting that Langdell and his followers viewed law in a programmatic manner and
considered it like a science); Steve Sheppard, An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture
Hall, in The History of Legal Education in the United States: Commentaries and Primary
Sources 6, 14-23, 25-31 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).
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law."37 The first American law schools and professors offered courses on
property and contracts, sales and torts, but for a time, nothing on criminal
law.38 Even as criminal law began to creep into the legal curriculum, it
struggled for respect, remaining "the Cinderella of the law course" (think
Cinderella as mistreated ash-maid rather than princess) until at least the
1930s.3 9
Part of the problem was that Langdell's model and the vision of law-
as-science focused on common law.40 In the field of criminal law, statutes
increasingly supplemented or even displaced judicial definitions of
crimes.41 Legislatures, with their different memberships at different time
periods, do not adhere to precedent and do not even attempt the co-
herence and consistency thatjudge-made law purports to display. But even
beyond the inelegance of actual criminal statutes, the whole field of
criminal law was seen as a messy array of often irrational policies and
erratic enforcement practices, and on the scholarly side, an intellectual
37. See Sheppard, supra note 36, at 27-29 (discussing Langdell as a teacher of con-
tracts, sales, and equity, and his contemporaries' classes on corporations, bailments, com-
mercial law, torts, partnerships, and trusts).
38. See Proceedings of the Association of American Law Schools, 1931 AALS Proc. 132,
150 [hereinafter AALS Proceedings] ("We believe that the law schools should undertake
the teaching of criminal law and procedure."); Sheppard, supra note 36, at 13 (noting that
the curriculum at the first American law school in Litchfield, Connecticut involved forty-
eight lectures that "ran the gamut of American private law"). Langdell added criminal law
to the Harvard Law School curriculum just a few years after he became the school's first
dean in 1870. Even then, the allocation of time and credits reflect a continued emphasis on
private law: Students had one hour per week of "Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure"
and one hour of Civil Procedure, along with two hours of Property and three hours each of
Torts and Contracts. See, e.g., Bruce A. Kimball, Students' Choices and Experience During
the Transition to Competitive Academic Achievement at Harvard Law School, 1876-1882,
55J. Legal Educ. 163, 172 tbl.2 (2005) (depicting two Harvard first-year students' schedules
for 1876-1877). Across all American law schools, the inclusion of criminal law apparently
was still not widespread in the 1930s. See AALS Proceedings, supra, at 150.
39. See Sheldon Glueck, Book Reviews, 43 Yale L.J. 512, 516 (1934) [hereinafter
Glueck, Book Reviews] (reviewing John Barker Waite, Cases on Criminal Law and Proce-
dure (1931)); AALS Proceedings, supra note 38, at 150.
40. See Sheppard, supra note 36, at 25-31.
41. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Prede-
cessors, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1098, 1138 (1978) ("By the time the idea of a Model Penal Code
emerged, the codification controversy of the nineteenth century was over. The legislatures
had long since asserted their dominance as lawmakers."); Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal
History of American Criminal Law Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the
Model Penal Code, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 691, 758-66 (2003) (discussing the nineteenth-
century codification movement in America with specific emphasis on criminal law). To be
sure, the proliferation of criminal statutes does not necessarily eliminate a role for judges
in defining criminal law, and arguably it shouldn't. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of
Common Law Crimes, 105 Va. L. Rev. 965, 968 (2019) ("Not only has codification failed to
fully displace the criminal common law, but codification has also failed to vindicate rule-of-
law values."). My point is simply that in the early decades of American legal education,
criminal law was difficult to characterize as a common law field-and as a science.
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backwater in comparison to the rational, coherent fields of private law.42
This state of affairs eventually generated a long campaign by Roscoe
Pound and other influential legal academics to develop, and motivate
others to develop, a sophisticated intellectual paradigm for this neglected
field.43
The neglected field, to be clear, was something called "substantive"
criminal law, which had only recently been severed from "adjective" law
or what we now call procedure.4 4 The general substance/procedure dis-
tinction is sometimes traced to William Blackstone, sometimes to Blackstone's
student and critic, Jeremy Bentham, but whoever gets credit for the idea,
it is widely agreed that the conceptual distinction took hold in American
legal thought in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.45 Today, this
distinction is both frequently assumed and frequently questioned, though
in the specific field of criminal law it is more often assumed than
questioned." Among criminal law specialists, "substantive" law is used to
refer to general principles of liability and definitions of specific crimes,
while procedure refers to the rules governing legal officials as they im-
plement the substantive law. That usage is consistent with a more general
conception of substantive law as the law that describes the rights, duties,
and obligations of private parties, while procedural law concerns mecha-
nisms of enforcement.47 One might say that substantive law is law with its
human interpreters and enforcers erased from the picture-and that, I
shall suggest, is the problem with the conception of "substantive criminal
law" as independent of procedure.48 But I get ahead of myself.
42. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1973-75 (describing scholarly
attitudes toward criminal law in the early twentieth century).
43. See id. at 1972-74.
44. On the development of the idea of substantive criminal law, see Lindsay Farmer,
Making the Modern Criminal Law 63-77 (2016).
45. See Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism 11 (2017) ("[T]he
category of procedure did not exist in any meaningful way before the mid-nineteenth
century . . . . [P] rocedure as such came to be recognized as a distinct body of law only well
into the nineteenth century."); D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited
with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presump-
tions", 30 UCLA L. Rev. 189, 191-92 (1982) (tracing the substance/procedure distinction
to Bentham); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 929-30 (1987) (tracing
the substance/procedure distinction to Blackstone).
46. See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 801, 812-18 (2010) (noting that the substance/procedure dichotomy is "en-
trenched" even as it is not well-defined or understood); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race,
and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2231,
2234-44 (1993) (discussing origins and implications of a "process-substance filter" used to
analyze criminal law).
47. See, e.g., Substantive Law, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining
substantive law as that "part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties,
and powers of parties").
48. See infra Part IV.
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The campaign to elevate and dignify substantive criminal law was
eventually successful. It is not clear that any single thinker was able to "do
for the substantive law of crimes what Wigmore did for the law of evidence
or what Williston did for contracts," as Roscoe Pound had apparently
exhorted his contemporaries.49 But by mid-twentieth century, several
scholars and teachers had developed together an account of criminal law's
structure that has disciplined criminal law courses, and criminal law
theory, ever since.50 According to this now-canonical model, the purpose
of the field is to identify conduct sufficiently injurious to individuals or to
society generally to warrant distinctive penalties, and to impose said
penalties on those who engaged in such conduct.51 Indeed, the model rests
on a set of interrelated claims about the ways in which criminal law is ex-
ceptional: Sanctions are exceptionally burdensome; the conduct targeted
by criminal law is exceptionally harmful or injurious; and the mechanisms
by which the exceptional burdens of criminal sanctions are imposed are
themselves exceptional in their guarantees of accuracy and predictabil-
ity.52 In the exceptionalist paradigm, crimes are defined according to a
basic structure that identifies precisely the actions and mental states (actus
reus and mens rea) that will subject a person to liability. 53 Additional rules
extend liability in specific circumstances, such as attempt or complicity.54
Defenses identify special circumstances in which liability should not be
imposed.55 These general principles of liability or nonliability are applied
and expressed through careful statutory definitions of specific offenses,
and the state bears a heavy burden to prove the conditions of liability. 56
On this account, criminal law is disciplined by internal constraints, logically
49. Sheldon Glueck, Roscoe Pound and Criminal Justice, 10 Crime & Delinquency
299, 317 (1964). Glueck was paraphrasing Roscoe Pound, What Can Law Schools Do for
CriminalJustice?, 12 Iowa L. Rev. 105, 106-07 (1927). Herbert Wechsler would later repeat
this characterization of Pound's exhortation, also invokingJohn Henry Wigmore and
Samuel Williston as inspiration, when he volunteered himself as the intellectual architect of
substantive criminal law. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1952) [hereinafter Wechsler, The Challenge]. Pound himself
wrote extensively about criminal law administration but called for someone else to
reexamine the underlying conceptual structure of substantive prohibitions. See Ristroph,
Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1974 n.99.
50. See Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1099 ("Only in recent years and in
recognition of a public duty have the schools and the profession evinced interest and
concern commensurate with the importance of [criminal law].").
51. The model emphasizes that crimes cause grave injury, but it does not commit to a
specific account of why such injuries require criminal sanctions. Thus, the model can
encompass various claims about the purpose of punishment, including retributive and
consequentialist heories. See infra section I.B.
52. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1953-54 (describing burdens
exceptionalism, subject-matter exceptionalism, and operational exceptionalism).
53. See id. at 1984 n.140.
54. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Am. Law. Inst. Proposed Official Draft 1962).
55. See id. § 4.01.
56. See id. at Art. 2.
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structured, and necessary to societal well-being-a field of law worthy of
academic and professional respect.
This basic paradigm came to structure instructional materials and
scholarly writing. It was, from its inception, a normative model presenting
itself as a descriptive account. Fittingly, then, one prominent incarnation
is a scholar's model code, of limited influence on actual legislatures but
profoundly influential in the academy: the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, first adopted in 1962.57 In the law school classroom,
the development of the now-canonical paradigm can be traced through a
pair of influential textbooks. The first was coauthored in 1940 by Herbert
Wechsler, who would later become the principal architect of the MPC;58
the second-first authored by Sanford Kadish and Monrad Paulsen in
1963-was deeply influenced by the MPC and is still widely used today.59
In the remainder of this Part, I want to highlight a few features of these
books, and the MPC, that departed sharply from prior conceptions of
criminal law-and from existing legal practices-to establish a new curric-
ular approach.
B. Teaching the Model, and Not the Reality
Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler were colleagues at Columbia
Law School-and had recently coauthored a very lengthy two-part article
on homicide-when they published Criminal Law and Its Administration in
1940.60 As Anders Walker has shown, one aim of this book was to replace
57. Id. The influence of the MPC in the academy is little disputed. See, e.g., Sanford
H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 943, 950-
51 (1999) (arguing that the MPC, once drafted, "remained at the center of criminal law
scholarship" at least until the 1980s); id. at 953 (describing the MPC mens rea framework
as "old hat now, the standard stuff of the first-year criminal law class"); id. at 981 (crediting
the MPC for the fact that "scholarship in the criminal law was finally raised to a level
comparable to that in other basic areas of law"). But the influence of the MPC on actual law
and legal practices is harder to assess, all the more so because scholars themselves in-
fluenced by the MPC may be prone to overestimate its influence beyond the academy. Much
of Kadish's own fifty-year respective bemoans failures and disappointments, including the
failure of the MPC to have greater impact on real legislation. See id. at 954, 957-58, 960
("When the dust cleared, the sun of the Model Penal Code test had set."); see also infra
note 77 and accompanying text.
58. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration (1940)
[hereinafter Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law]; see also Walker, The Anti-Case Method,
supra note 35, at 237 (discussing Wechsler's imprint on the MPC).
59. Monrad G. Paulsen & Sanford H. Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes (1st ed.
1962); see also Sanford H. Kadish, StephenJ. Schulhofer & Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law
and Its Processes (10th ed. 2017) [hereinafter Kadish et al. 10th]; Jens David Ohlin, The
Changing Market for Criminal Law Casebooks, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1156 (2016)
[hereinafter Ohlin, Changing Market] (describing the Kadish book as a "market leader"
that "dominate [s] the field").
60. The homicide article is "probably the longest article ... ever written on the
subject." Kamisar, supra note 35, at 249; see also Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. I & II), 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 1261 (1937).
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Langdell's version of the case method with a more explicitly normative
mode of instruction that brought philosophy and social science to bear on
discussions of what law should be.61 The new book was not especially
focused on preparing students to practice criminal law, for criminal law
practice was a grimy endeavor understandably unattractive to "the bright
young man with an eye to profit and social position."" Instead, Michael
and Wechsler aimed to ensure that those bright young men would be
prepared, as "enlightened leaders," as legislators, administrators, or
simply influential citizens, to make criminal law the best that it could be.63
As the coauthors put it, "Our enterprise calls for a method which
emphasizes general normative ideas rather than specific legal rules.""
Without contesting Walker's analysis, I want to emphasize a few fea-
tures of the book beyond its skepticism about the case method. First,
Michael and Wechsler focused heavily on the law of homicide-unsurpris-
ingly, perhaps, given their recent scholarship.5 That was a novelty: Earlier
casebooks had collected criminal law cases across a more representative
range of offenses, including a great many offenses that we would now call
petty or "regulatory."66 To the extent earlier casebooks were weighted
heavily toward one type of crime, it was property offenses-the intricate
common law distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses,
61. See Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 219 ("Convinced that the so-
called 'Langdellian method' had contributed to the Supreme Court's destruction of early
New Deal programs by fostering a view of the law as a 'closed-system,' Michael and Wechsler
hoped to disrupt Christopher Columbus Langdell's legacy and open students' eyes to law's
interrelationship with society.").
62. George Wilfred Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1123, 1123 (1941); see
also Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 227 (quoting Wechsler for the
proposition that, in the 1930s, there was little interest in criminal law since it was "generally
thought to have no money in it").
63. Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 230.
64. Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 3.
65. See id. at pt. II, bk. I, ch. 1 (dedicating over 250 pages to homicide).
66. For example, consider the cases in the first chapter of H.W. Chaplin's 1891 case-
book, possibly the first American criminal law casebook. The offenses charged in those cases
include building a dam across a stream and thereby causing public injury by preventing fish
from passing; selling "spirituous liquors" without a license; public corruption; poisoning a
cow; and obtaining shoes by false pretenses. See H.W. Chaplin, Cases on Criminal Law: A
Collection of Reported Cases on Some of the Leading Heads of Criminal Law: Prepared for
Use in the Law School of Harvard University 1-14 (1891). Joseph Beale's casebook first
appeared in 1894 and then "presid[ed] over the field in lonely majesty" for decades, E.W.
Puttkammer, Book Review, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386, 386 (1941), or possibly shared the throne
with Francis Sayre, see Glueck, Book Reviews, supra note 39, at 514 (referencing "the two
standard case books in the field, Beale's and Sayre's"). Beale's first chapter used the same
dam-building and unlicensed liquor-sales cases that Chaplin had used, but also added a case
involving charges of libel of the President and another involving a prosecution for
disinterring a dead body.Joseph Henry Beale,Jr., A Selection of Cases and Other Authorities upon
Criminal Law 1-9 (1894).
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and so forth-that occupied substantial attention.67 Second, as suggested
by their book's title, Michael and Wechsler viewed the "administration" of
criminal law as something distinct from the law itself. Administration was
a realm of discretion, they emphasized, whereas substantive criminal law
was an independent field and the main focus of the book.68 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, their turn toward normativity was not open-
ended. That is, the book was not designed to promote or explore a wide
range of competing views about criminal law.69 Its aim was to encourage
students to think as wise legislators, but Wechsler already had a specific
vision of wise legislation in mind. That vision comes through in his
textbook, as it would soon come through in the Model Penal Code.
Criminal Law and Its Administration innovated in several respects, but
in one important regard it followed the path of earlier criminal law
teaching materials. Namely, it did not discuss race or racial disparities
among those prosecuted and punished. Racialized uses of criminal law
have taken place since this country's earliest days, but this dimension of
criminal law was not widely acknowledged or well documented until much
later in the twentieth century.70 Michael and Wechsler did include a short
67. See, e.g., Frances Bowes Sayre, A Selection of Cases on Criminal Law, at ix-x (1927)
(devoting fewer than fifty pages to homicide and almost 200 to theft offenses, not including
robbery). Michael and Wechsler retained a fairly lengthy discussion of theft, albeit one
much shorter than the chapter on homicide. See Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra
note 58, at 401-582; id. at 3 (noting offenses other than homicide and theft "will be dealt
with more summarily" in the book).
68. See, e.g., Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 2 (noting the crim-
inal law's "predominantly statutory character" and "the large areas of discretion in its
administration"). Michael and Wechsler still found the "substance" of the law to reside
primarily in cases, and a primary function of their non-judicial sources is to provide grounds
to critique cases. See Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 230 ("Though
Michael and Wechsler incorporated cases into their text, at least half of their materials were
designed not to drive home the basic principles of the common law, so much as to engender
debate about what that law, ultimately, should be."). But see Louis B. Schwartz, The
Wechslerian Revolution in Criminal Law and Administration, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1159, 1160
(1978). Schwartz argues that "[t]he interplay of procedure and substance is a persistent
theme of the book," but most of the examples he cites concern burdens of proof. See id. at
1162. For further discussion of burdens of proof and the separation of substance from
procedure, see infra section II.A.
69. See Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 284-86 (2009) (discussing
the rationalist, utilitarian view of criminal law underlying Michael and Wechsler's book).
70. See Paul Finkelman, Introduction, Race, Law, and American History 1700-1990,
at vii (1992) ("[S]ince the colonial period criminal prosecution, discrimination in trial
practices, and police activities have been used as mechanisms for racial control and
subordination."). It remains unclear whether Michael and Wechsler were ignorant of racial
disparities, or merely unwilling to mention them. For example, convict leasing, a practice
by which vagrancy prosecutions were used to force Black persons into labor in southern
states, was not quite eradicated when Michael and Wechsler published their book, but the
practice is not mentioned in the book's discussion of vagrancy. See Michael & Wechsler,
Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 1008-54. Even by the 1930s, at least some in the legal
academy, including the dean of Duke Law School, did recognize that criminal law was often
used as an instrument of racial subordination. See, e.g., Justin Miller, Criminal Law-An
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section on "The Personal Characteristics of Criminals" in their opening
chapter, perhaps influenced by the waning eugenics movement, noting
interest in the "heredity" of criminals.71 Michael and Wechsler hinted that
social and economic deprivation rather than heredity could influence
patterns of criminal offending, but they minimized these factors and
ultimately found no way "to distinguish criminals from non-criminals in
terms of their essential characteristics."72 In this inquiry into "essential
characteristics," Michael and Wechsler did not ask whether state officials
might target specific groups for prosecution. As Part II discusses further,
the idea that public officials can influence who becomes a criminal is
absent from the normative vision of criminal law launched at midcentury.
Instead, the vision depicts substantive criminal law as color-blind, an
approach consistent with Herbert Wechsler's professed belief that law
should be based on "neutral principles."73
After some initial skepticism,74 the Michael and Wechsler book
quickly established itself as the standard-bearer for teaching and, as some
of its student-readers became a new generation of scholars, criminal law
scholarship.75 The book was updated with supplements, but the authors
Agency for Social Control, 43 Yale L.J. 691, 704-05 (1934) (discussing racialized
enforcement from before the Civil War to the present). But detailed statistical data on racial
disparities would not be collected and widely disseminated until later. The national system
for crime and enforcement statistics, the Uniform Crime Reports, was introduced only in
1930 and did not initially include race-specific data. Agencies began reporting data on the
race of arrestees in 1952. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook 2 (2004),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/additional-ucr-publications/ucrhandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5
H3-P5P6].
71. See Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 20-24; see also Russell D.
Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1375, 1387
(2009) (discussing the "major impact" of eugenics on academics in the 1930s and citing
Michael and Wechsler as examples).
72. Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 23-24.
73. Wechsler famously argued that courts should base their decisions on "analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result," but he seemed to think neutrality a self-
evident concept. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 15. Wechsler found the
doctrine of separate-but-equal-so l ng as facilities were in fact comparable-to satisfy his
vision of neutrality, and he worried that the Supreme Court had failed to articulate a race-
neutral reason to strike down mandated segregation in public schools. Id. at 31-34.
Wechsler suggested that when he and a Black co-counsel were not allowed to dine together
at the Supreme Court, "[H]e did not suffer more than I in knowing that we had to go to
Union Station to lunch together during the recess." Id. at 34.
74. See Puttkammer, supra note 66, at 389 (criticizing the book for focusing too heavily
on substantive law to the detriment of the administration of the law); John S. Strahorn, Jr.,
Book Review, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1414, 1415 (1941) (expressing skepticism of the book's
"exotic" approach). Other reviewers were much more enthusiastic from the outset. See
Stumberg, supra note 62, at 1124 ("The teaching materials compiled by Michael and
Wechsler afford a welcome opportunity for experimentation to those who feel that a course
in criminal law should go below the surface of positive law in action.").
75. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 1159 (crediting the book with effecting "the
remarkable reorganization of an intellectual province"); Walker, The Anti-Case Method,
supra note 35, at 236, 240 (discussing the popularity of the Michael and Wechsler book in
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never produced a full second edition. Jerome Michael died in 1953,
around the time that Wechsler was given principal responsibility for the
drafting of the MPC.76 Like Michael and Wechsler's textbook, the MPC
was drafted with keen awareness of irrationality in existing law, but on the
faith that criminal law could be rationalized.77 Though the MPC had at
best mixed results in its effort to change the content of American penal
codes, it had an immediate and profound effect on criminal law teaching.
Wechsler began to incorporate drafts of the MPC into his own teaching
materials, including supplements to his casebook, even before the project
was complete.78 And nearly every criminal law casebook published since
1962 has featured the MPC prominently.79 Since the 1960s, then, the
course called "criminal law" in American law schools instructs students in
a specific normative model.
Though commentators have recognized "the Wechslerian revolution,"8 0
a few subtle but important adjustments to the curricular model described
above have occurred through the many editions of Kadish's casebook. In
1962, the same year that the Model Penal Code was finalized, Sanford
Kadish and Monrad Paulsen published Criminal Law and Its Processes-
opening their new book with a quotation from Herbert Wechsler, of
course.81 This book replaced Michael and Wechsler's text as "the classic in
the field," and, now in its tenth edition, remains widely used and
imitated.82 And like the casebook that inspired and preceded it, Criminal
the 1950s and noting that "Michael and Wechsler's text was still something of a benchmark
by which other casebooks were judged even in the 1960s"); see also Herbert Packer, Book
Review, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 790, 791 (1964) (reviewing Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59) ("One
might almost date the arrival of full intellectual respectability in the study of criminal law
from the publication in 1940 of Michael and Wechsler's [book] from which many of those
who are now in the forefront of criminal studies in this country had their first exposure.").
76. See Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 236-37.
77. See Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1100-01 (outlining the substantive
defects of penal codes that need to be reexamined by the MPC). As the next Part discusses
at greater length, there was little attention to minor offenses or the parameters of criminal
law in the MPC. At the same time, Wechsler's hostility toward rules of liability that focus on
results, and his concomitant emphasis on risk creation, would help establish a powerful tool
for the carceral state. See infra Part II.
78. Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 237.
79. See infra Part II; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
80. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 1159.
81. Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59, at vii (quoting Wechsler, The Challenge, supra
note 49, at 1098).
82. The only contemporary casebook that may hold as much market share as Kadish
et al. 10th, supra note 59, is Joshua Dressler's, now coauthored with Stephen Garvey. See
Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (8th ed. 2019)
[hereinafter Dressler 8th]. But Dressler has referred to his own book as "son of Kadish" and
described Kadish as "the classic in the field." Joshua Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory,
and Feminism: Some Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of Courting
Controversy, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 1143, 1146-47, 1147 n.11 (2004) [hereinafter Dressler,
Criminal Law, Moral Theory].
1648 [Vol. 120:1631
CARCERAL CURRICULUM
Law and Its Processes has shaped not just students' minds but also scholars'.83
With a few slight adjustments discussed below, Criminal Law and Its
Processes kept Michael and Wechsler's basic framework in which students
were provided both cases and extrajudicial materials and invited to
imagine the best design for the law. Like his predecessors, Kadish as
casebook author was not neutral on the normative questions he raised: He
organized the course around a particular justificatory account of criminal
law-albeit one slightly more fixed on blame-and slightly less rationalist
and utilitarian than Wechsler's model.84
Over its many editions, Criminal Law and Its Processes made a few
adjustments that have proven influential. First, the book initially tried to
offer fairly comprehensive coverage of both substantive criminal law and
criminal procedure, but eventually abandoned that goal.85 Still, the ref-
erence to process in the book's title remains apt in one key respect: Even
in recent editions, the book's normative model emphasizes certain proce-
dures, such as a presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, that give legitimacy to substantive law.86
Second, the first edition's materials on morals offenses, used to raise
questions about principles of criminalization, were eventually moved from
the first pages of the book and shortened.87 The book still sometimes asks
students to consider whether specific kinds of conduct should be subject
to criminal penalties at all, but overall, theories of criminalization are
given relatively little attention in comparison to theories of punishment.88
Finally, as mentioned above, Criminal Law and Its Processes has relied
83. See Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, supra note 82, at 1146 ("Few casebooks
influence the way lawyers or scholars think about a subject, but this book qualifies in that
regard."). Anders Walker is again a useful source on the evolution and importance of this
book (and its debt to Wechsler), identifying as its main innovations a long section
addressing (and critiquing) morals offenses such as adultery and fornication, and the inte-
gration of the MPC throughout the book. See Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note
35, at 238-44 ("Kadish and Paulsen continued down Wechsler's road in the 1960s, away
from the case method and towards a more open-ended inquiry into why the law existed as
it did.").
84. See infra Part II (detailing the ideological orientation of the current edition of
Kadish along with other contemporary criminal law casebooks, all or nearly all of which
follow the Wechsler/Kadish model).
85. Walker, The Anti-Case Method, supra note 35, at 239 (noting that Paulsen and
Kadish originally planned to emphasize procedure over substance, but "the tail wagged the
dog" and most of the materials on procedure were eventually eliminated).
86. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 18-52.
87. Id. at 150-56.
88. See id. at 5 n.20 (listing passages in the book that ask whether specific types of
conduct should be criminalized at all). Compare id. at 81-150 (discussing the justification
of punishment), with id. at 150-56 (introducing the harm principle as a constraint on




heavily on the MPC from its first edition, using it to illustrate a coherent
codification of both offense definitions and general principles.89
The embedding of substantive law within certain specified proce-
dures, and the shrinking but still present question about the proper scope
of criminal law, are important illustrations of a key aspect of Kadish's
ideological orientation: He wanted to contain the scope of substantive
criminal law, a goal that Wechsler shared but that Kadish made much
more prominent and explicit.90 Indeed, the same year that Kadish
introduced his casebook, he coined the term "overcriminalization."91 He
would pursue that theme across a half century of scholarship, persistently
criticizing the scope of actual criminal law and doggedly trying to
invigorate meaningful limitations on the penal power.92 Principles of
criminalization were one source of limitation; procedural guarantees, such
as the presumption of innocence, were another. Kadish went so far as to
argue that the substantive criminal law course was "a course in civil
liberties."93 This unyielding effort to limit criminal law raises a question:
On what basis could anyone see Kadish's casebook, or the broader
curriculum he embraced and helped perpetuate, as contributing to
further expansions of criminal law and the development of a carceral state?
Is it not more likely that mass convictions are the product of a failure to
heed the advice of Kadish, Wechsler, and other influential twentieth-
century academics? The next Part considers ways in which educators' good
intentions could, perversely, pave a road to hell.94
89. See Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59, at x-xi ("[W]e have included many of the
proposals and some of the commentary of the Model Penal Code as an integral part of the
material.").
90. See, e.g., Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1132 (noting that a model
code should emphasize "serious injuries and threats to vital human interests rather than the
vast, heterogeneous mass of special legislation declaring this or that conduct a crime").
91. Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Process, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 909 (1962).
92. See, e.g., id. at 909-11 (arguing that broad criminal statutes, which encompass con-
duct not the target of legislative concern, promote abuse of power by the police).
93. Sanford H. Kadish, Address, Why Substantive Criminal Law-A Dialogue, 29 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1980) [hereinafter Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law].
94. Margo Schlanger has criticized perversity arguments as "quite fashionable in
criminal justice," seductive and attention-grabbing but little supported by empirical
evidence. Margo Schlanger, No Reason to Blame Liberals (Or, The Unbearable Lightness
of Perversity Arguments), New Rambler, https://newramblerreview.com/images/files/Mar
go-SchlangerReview-ofNaomi-Murakawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XZG-47L9] (last visited
Aug. 21, 2020) (reviewing Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison
America (2014)). If an argument is unsupported by empirical evidence, though, it's not
clear what labeling it as a "perversity argument" adds to the critique. Perhaps Schlanger
seeks to alert scholars to the boundaries of their own rationality so that they may be on guard
for the seductive sirens of perversity. Of course, wanting attention or liking perversity are
just two of many motivations that may distort human reasoning. Confirmation bias may also
cloud our judgment, along with the related tendency to be defensive when one's own
political views are criticized; either could produce resistance to perversity arguments even
when there is evidence in support of the perversity claim. Ultimately, we should evaluate a
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II. PRO-CARCERAL THEMES IN THE CLASSROOM
By the latter decades of the twentieth century, criminal law had won
intellectual respectability, and substantive criminal law was a required
course at most American law schools.95 Notably, criminal procedure has
never been required at most schools, though that subject lends itself to
more focus on enforcement realities.96 Thus, the only criminal law in-
struction many students will have is a deeply normative course premised
on a specific model of what criminal law should be. To summarize again
that normative paradigm, it holds that criminal law has a substance that is
independent of enforcement choices. That substance is to be found in
purportedly color-blind doctrines and statutes, articulated by judges and
legislatures guided by rational principle.97 Individual courts and legis-
latures may err, of course, but they have gotten criminal law right enough
times that careful observers can discern criminal law's structure and
principles and use that structure to critique the occasional misstep-such
as a statute without a mens rea requirement.98 The structure of criminal
law includes various limiting principles that constrain what conduct can
scholarly claim about the factors contributing to mass incarceration by looking at the
evidence offered in support of it, keeping in mind the many biases that may distort our
assessments.
95. A survey published in 1984 found that 131 of the 146 law schools that belonged to
the American Association of Law Schools included criminal law in the first-year curriculum,
and seven more required criminal law as an upper-level course. Survey Shows Variety in Law
Courses Required, Syllabus, June 1984, at 1, 5.
96. After World War II, Harvard added one credit hour to its required criminal law
course in order to incorporate criminal procedure and administration, but it then elimi-
nated the procedure component in 2008. Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 35,
at 283 n.13; Lester B. Orfield, Book Review, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 716, 716 (1952). Most law
schools do not require any courses in criminal procedure, as noted by justice Ginsburg in
dissent in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 79-109 (2011). In Connick, the majority re-
fused to grant a remedy for systemic procedural violations in the New Orleans district
attorney's office and suggested that the district attorney should not be penalized because
he reasonably relied on his employees' professional training to teach such obligations as the
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. See id. at 64-67; see also id. at 106 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that criminal procedure is not required by most law schools).
97. Executive branch enforcement agents-most importantly, police and prose-
cutors-are largely absent from this vision of substantive criminal law. Criminal law's
substance is thus both prior to and independent of enforcement decisions. Police and pros-
ecutors may be faithful or unfaithful to their obligation to enforce substantive law, but the
substantive law nevertheless exists and can be identified, whatever the degree of executive
fidelity.
98. Reflecting on Sanford Kadish's work, Claire Finkelstein characterized "the
criminal law's requirement of mens rea" as "the central distinguishing characteristic of the
institution." Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 895, 896
(2000). She acknowledged that her conception rendered "problematic" the presence of
criminal liability based on negligence, id. at 914, and strict criminal liability is presumably
all the more problematic. But Finkelstein's essay, like much criminal law scholarship, fails
to distinguish clearly between aspiration and description. The aspects of existing law that
contradict her idealized model are simply dismissed as "problematic" and in need of reform.
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be criminalized-that which inflicts grave injuries on individuals or
society-as well as the form that criminalization must take: clear offense
definitions codified by legislatures.99
The model has been aspirational since its inception, but it is con-
sistently depicted to students as descriptive. In this Part, I want to examine
several interrelated aspects of this model that I call pro-carceral, by which
I mean they make it more likely that lawyers and policymakers will pursue,
not avoid, the use of criminal law. Section II.A begins with the supposed
constraints: the legality principle and other putative limits on substantive
criminal law. Section II.B addresses casebooks' presentation of punish-
ment theory, which focuses more on reasons to punish than reasons not
to. Section II.C examines the curriculum's heavy emphasis on homicide as
part of a refrain that criminal law addresses "all the deepest injuries"10 0
that private persons might inflict on one another. Section II.D discusses
the way the substantive criminal law curriculum obscures the human
agents of criminal law and how, in doing so, it obscures ways that criminal
law operates as a tool of racial oppression. Finally, in section II.E, I suggest
that the casebook genre itself may impose constraints on efforts to depart
from the existing canon or to transform it.
A preliminary word on terminology and methodology is in order. To
identify the content and ideological underpinnings of "the course" or "the
curriculum," I refer primarily to criminal law casebooks.101 As many of
their authors acknowledge, criminal law casebooks haven't much departed
from the model that Wechsler pioneered and Kadish refined.102 But some
readers may question whether there is in fact a uniform curriculum and
whether it makes sense to speak of "the course" rather than as many
different courses as there are individual teachers. Throughout this Part, I
seek to demonstrate that there is enough consistency across casebooks to
identify a common curricular model and widely accepted curricular canons.
99. See infra section IIA.
100. The phrase is Herbert Wechsler's, but it opens Sanford Kadish's casebook. See
Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1098; see also Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59,
at vii.
101. Following Douglas Husak, I assume for now that "[t]he tables of contents of
leading casebooks can be used to identify what we tend to cover in our classes." Douglas
Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 261, 261 (2003) [hereinafter
Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important]. I discuss the possibility of "teaching against the
casebook" infra section ILE.
102. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at xi ("I can think of no higher accolade than
if someone were to say of this book, 'Why, it is a son-of-Kadish .... '); Harris & Lee,
Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 264 (2009) ("Our casebook ... situates us
squarely as granddaughters of Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, as well as daughters
of Sandy Kadish .... ").
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A. Legality and Other Imagined Constraints
Criminal sanctions involve obvious restrictions of liberty. In a society
that professes to value and protect liberty, those who would promote the
use of criminal sanctions must first make them palatable. One standard
path is to emphasize that criminal law is itself carefully constrained, subject
to legal limitations that will protect against abuse. This section examines
how casebooks develop that theme.
In fact, most criminal law casebooks begin with the claim that the awe-
some power to punish is subject to legal constraints: nulla poena sine lege,
no punishment without law.103 Most prominently, the books emphasize the
principle of legality and the presumption of innocence.104 Legality, as an
academic and curricular term, is meant to express something more than
the mere distinction between permitted and prohibited conduct. As a legal
term of art and in criminal law casebooks, legality encompasses the idea
that criminal liability must not be imposed unless the defendant's conduct
was prohibited by a preexisting statute, the ex post designation of conduct
as criminal by an executive official or a judge is prohibited.105 Coupled
with a presumption of innocence said to require the state to prove a
violation of a statute beyond a reasonable doubt, legality is thus a constraint on
103. In a fairly typical depiction, Kadish characterizes nulla poena as [o]ne of the most
ancient and widely repeated doctrines of the criminal law." Kadish et al. 10th, supra note
59, at 160. But there is some evidence that, like many a legal term, the Latin phrasing was
simply selected to give an ancient patina to a novel idea. The particular phrase nulla poena
sine lege was introduced by German legal theorist P.J.A. von Feuerbach in the nineteenth
century. Tatjana Hornle, P.J.A. von Feuerbach and His Textbook of the Common Penal
Law, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law 119, 131 (Markus Dirk Dubber ed.,
2014). To be sure, proponents of the principle argue that its roots are older than the par-
ticular phrasing. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 Yale L.J. 165, 169-70
(1937).
104. For a recent and detailed survey of discussions of legality in American criminal law
casebooks, see Hessick, supra note 41, at 973-75 & nn.21-29. One notable exception should
be identified: The casebook initially coauthored by the late William Stuntz does not contain
a section on legality at all.Joseph L. Hoffmann & WilliamJ. Stuntz, Defining Crimes (3d ed.
2017). Stuntz may be the single scholar most responsible for the academy's realization, in
the last years of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first, that substantive
crime definitions do not determine criminal liability. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 509 (2001) (warning that we
are approaching a point at which "criminal codes ... cover everything and decide nothing
[and] serve only to delegate power to district attorneys' offices and police departments").
Consistent with Stuntz's scholarly views, the Hoffmann and Stuntz book seems more con-
cerned with racially discriminatory enforcement than the mere fact of police discretion. For
example, it does include a section on vagueness doctrine, but it suggests that discriminatory
enforcement, rather than vagueness per se, is the problem. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra,
at 34-52; id. at 51 (asking, of the Chicago anti-loitering statute, why notice is "so important
when it comes to laws of this sort").
105. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 91 (" [A] person may not be convicted and
punished unless her conduct was defined as criminal (today . .. by statute rather than by
judges). This prohibition ... constitutes the essence of the principle of legality, a principle
that has been characterized as the first principle of American criminal law.").
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the imposition of criminal liability, and it ostensibly prevents prosecutors
or courts from choosing who will be made a criminal.106
Closely related to this principle is the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
which prohibits criminal statutes that are sufficiently vague to allow
enforcers, orjudges, to decide after the fact what is criminal. 107 Along with
a section on vagueness doctrine, many casebooks also include some
material on the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments and other constitutional limits on penal power. Such
doctrines are often presented as positive law with meaningful effects, not
as philosophical aspirations.108 Thus, students begin the course with the
reassurance that the distinctive burdens of criminal sanctions are imposed
only in limited circumstances. Punishment is a serious enterprise that
imposes great pain on individuals, the casebooks solemnly acknowledge,
but here in America we wield that weapon with the safety net of due
process and legality.
In reality, there is no safety net-or, if there is, it is so riddled with
holes that it offers little protection. Outside the classroom, in the academic
journal or the faculty lounge, it is now standard for scholars to
acknowledge that criminal codes simply do not determine what conduct
106. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) ("The requirement that guilt of a
criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our
early years as a Nation."); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 87 (1895) (noting an earlier
case that referred to a court in a criminal case as "a tribunal that obeys the law as made"
and not one "which makes its own law" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kane
v. Commonwealth, 1 Crim. L. Mag. 47, 57 (1879))). The term "proof" conjures mathemat-
ical or scientific certainty, but legal proof requires no such thing, and indeed, a fact may be
"proved" legally even when it is contradicted by scientific evidence. See Andrea Roth,
Defying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific Proof of Innocence,
93 B.U. L. Rev. 1643, 1664-65 (2013) (describing paternity suits in which juries found the
defendant to be the father notwithstanding blood-type evidence that excluded the defend-
ant as the father). Thus, even in the rare case that goes to a jury trial rather than ending in
a plea, the determination of guilt is a matter of conviction (the jurors' beliefs, or convic-
tions) rather than "proof" in a scientific or mathematical sense. See id. at 1653-54 (" [S]o
long as jurors . . . personally believe a confession or eyewitness, their guilty verdict would
almost surely escape review, however irrational.").
107. Some casebooks present void-for-vagueness as one component of legality. See, e.g.,
Markus Dirk Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and
Comments 105-06 (2d ed. 2009).
108. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 65-66 (7th ed. 2015)
(identifying proportionality, "precision in definition," "need for a culpable mental state,"
and "proof of guilt to the jury" as constitutional limitations on the imposition of criminal
liability); Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 157 ("Three foundational principles limit the
imposition of punishment: legality, culpability, and proportionality. Each of these principles
has a long history of recognition in common-law precedents and in state penal codes based
on them."). But see id. at 158 (asking "to what extent the system of justice in the United
States is in fact faithful to the three principles identified here"); Cynthia Lee & Angela P.
Harris, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 76 (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Lee & Harris 4th]
(noting that the vagueness doctrine and other constitutional constraints aspire, without
success, to eliminate discretion).
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or which people will be subject to criminal sanctions.109 To be sure, these
scholars usually maintain that legality was alive and well until the late
twentieth century, and that we could yet revive it by reforming and pruning
criminal codes.11 0 That claim is inconsistent with historical and linguistic
experience: The breadth and porousness of criminal statutes-and the
inevitability of broad enforcement discretion-were well known even as
Michael and Wechsler developed their pedagogical model."1 The
principle of legality was always more aspiration than reality. But a few gen-
erations of scholars have now been educated in a model that posits legality
as a doctrine of positive law, and so when they observe that doctrine
contradicted, they conclude that something has gone awry.112 That is, even
when casebooks acknowledge that statutes do not presently dictate the
109. See, e.g., Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 14, at 5 ("The system dispenses not justice
according to law, but the justice' of official discretion."); Dripps, Brief Response, supra note
35, at 257-59 (2009) ("[P]roof problems are less ubiquitous than purely discretionary
choices about what charges of the many possible to select in a given case."); Husak, Is the
Criminal Law Important, supra note 101, at 262 ("The factors that govern whether or not
persons will be punished are not much affected by the content of the statutes we teach and
write about");
110. See, e.g., Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important, supra note 101, at 270-71 (noting
that the current criminal law is not one we ought to have and that there is "good reason to
reform the criminal law to restore the rule of law").
111. For example, many scholars writing at the time that Michael and Wechsler intro-
duced their casebook were aware that legality was at best an aspiration, since those who
administered criminal law (executive officials and judges) would inevitably have sufficient
discretion to stretch old statutes to serve new purposes. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Theft, Law
and Society 262, 274-75 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter J. Hall, Theft] ("The judges ... attempt
today, as in the past, to apply the law justly. Their performance of this function is condi-
tioned by professional techniques and traditions, and is sometimes disguised because of the
necessity to make the decisions appear both plausible and consistent with precedent.");
Livingston Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes 1887-1936,50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 637 (1937)
[hereinafter L. Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes] (noting that many states and judges
have moved towards a "liberal construction" of penal statutes rather than the more traditional
"strict construction"). American scholars' interest in legality as a normative ideal seems to
have increased sharply at midcentury, in part as a reaction to the rejection of that principle
by Germany and Russia. See Livingston Hall, Book Review, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 846, 847 (1947)
[hereinafter L. Hall, Book Review] (reviewing Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal
Law (1947)); see also Lawrence Preuss, Punishment by Analogy in National Socialist Penal
Law, 26 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 847, 847 (1936) (quoting the newly enacted
"punishment by analogy" section of National Socialist law and concluding that "the
principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.. . has been abolished"). In 1952, Wechsler
acknowledged the problem of "domination by administration," or the fact that prosecuting
agencies rather than written statutes dictated outcomes, but he held onto the belief that
better-drafted statutes would restrain administrative and interpretive discretion to a tolerable
degree. See Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1100-02.
112. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 Hastings L.J. 633, 639 (2005) (characterizing broad
criminalization as a "trend" that is destroying the rule of law, and noting that "[a] rrest,
punishment, and the level of punishment are now determined as much by the ad hoc




scope of criminal liability, the suggestion is that this is a particular path-
ology of contemporary law rather than an enduring feature of criminal
law.113 It's not difficult to see why: To be direct about the extent to which
enforcement discretion has always controlled outcomes might lead
students to wonder about the relevance of a substantive criminal law
course. 114
I have focused on legality because it is sometimes identified as "the
first principle of American criminal law,"1 15 but, as noted, an array of other
similar limiting principles are also frequently presented to students as
meaningful constraints on the state's power to punish: a constitutional
proportionality requirement;1 16 a presumption of innocence that requires
the prosecution to prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt;117 a
113. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 158 ("Is a relaxation of the
commitment to some or all of these principles responsible in some measure for the current
record high rates of incarceration?").
114. Indeed, students able to discover on their own the predominant role of enforce-
ment discretion have long wondered about the relevance of the course. See Kadish, Why
Substantive Criminal Law, supra note 93, at 5 (quoting a hypothetical student critic for the
proposition that the "discretionary judgments of officials pretty well undercut the role of
the substantive criminal law"). For further discussion of this Kadish essay, see infra section
III.B.
115. Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 91.
116. Most casebooks include at least one Eighth Amendment proportionality case while
offering little or no information on the (in)frequency with which Eighth Amendment
challenges have actually freed defendants or led to reversals of sentences. See, e.g., Dix,
supra note 108, at 66-82 (presenting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which declared
unconstitutional mandatory life without parole sentences for those who committed crimes
as juveniles); Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 205-16 (presenting Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11 (2003), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)). Ewing died in prison, and
Miller and Graham are still incarcerated. See Sara Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing: Three
Strikes Laws and the Limits of the Eighth Amendment Proportionality View, in Criminal
Law Stories 427, 452 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013) (noting that Gary Albert
Ewing "died still guarded 24 hours a day by correctional officers" at the California Medical
Facility); Corrections Offender Network: Inmate Population Information Detail, Fla. Dep't
of Corr., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/offenderSearch/detail.aspx?Page=Detail&DCNumber=
J25706&TypeSearch=AI [https://perma.cc/4H2C-5W6X] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (not-
ing that Terrance J. Graham is still incarcerated at Charlotte Correctional Institution);
Incarceration Network, Ala. Dep't of Corr., http://www.doc.state.al.us/InmateHistory (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (noting that Evan Miller is
still incarcerated at St. Clair Correctional Facility). The Kadish casebook does include a note
on "[p]roportionality review in practice," which clarifies that "successful Eighth
Amendment challenges continue to be rare." Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 219.
117. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 9-18; John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg &
Guyora Binder, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 16-19 (8th ed. 2017) [hereinafter Kaplan
et al. 8th]; Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at 38-41. For criminal convictions based upon
guilty pleas-that is, almost all convictions-the prosecution does not have to prove
anything. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Of course, in theory, burdens of proof
could still be important in determining the parties' relative bargaining power during plea
negotiations. It is widely accepted among scholars, however, that an array of factors skews
the bargaining process in favor of prosecutors and effectively relieves them of most of the
weight of the burden of proof. See supra notes 5-6. Moreover, as noted above, even in the
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culpability principle;118 and possibly, rules of lenity and strict construction
for penal statutes.119 The idea of culpability, and in particular the claim
that criminal conviction requires proof of a carefully specified mens rea,
is prevalent throughout the entire criminal law course.120 To see that these
various principles are unfulfilled aspirations rather than actual constraints
on the state's power to impose criminal sanctions, one need only close the
casebooks and turn to legal scholarship, where the failure of the real world
to correspond to the scholarly model is repeatedly bemoaned.121 Here
rare case that goes to a jury trial, prosecutors do not have to "prove" guilt in the scientific
or mathematical sense of the word proof; they merely have to convince a jury to vote for
guilt. See supra note 106.
118. Several casebooks and many scholars use the term culpability to describe a general
requirement that criminal liability requires both a blameworthy act and a blameworthy men-
tal state. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 221 (presenting "[t]he [r] equirement
of [v]oluntary [a]ction" as the first component of culpability); id. at 222 (referencing "the
fundamental principle that criminal liability always requires an 'actus reus,' that is, the
commission of some voluntary act that is prohibited by law"); id. at 258-59 (claiming that
the criminal law limits punishment in the absence of fault through the requirement of mens
rea). Consider also "the sentence that sums up the basic structure of criminal law,"
according to the newest entrant to the criminal law casebook market: "The Guilty Hand
moved by the Guilty Mind, under the Required Circumstances, that sometimes causes a
Result in the absence of a justification or Excuse." Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Law: Cases,
Controversies and Problems 1 (2019) [hereinafter Kennedy, Criminal Law]. In reality,
however, neither "a guilty mind" nor "a guilty hand" are actually required for criminal
liability. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in The
Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays 17, 23-25 (2010) (arguing that the idea that
"criminal liability requires an act" is not true "as a descriptive generalization, nor as an
analytical truth, nor as a pure evaluation"); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the
Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 731 (1960) (discussing the "proliferation" of impositions
of criminal liability "in the absence of any requisite mental element").
119. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and Practice 113
(2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter Ohlin 2d] ("Although courts rarely invoke the rule of lenity, it
can sometimes provide a crucial factor that tips the scales in favor of the defendant."). But
see Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 74-89 (identifying "the not-quite-rule of lenity"
and explaining why it has little practical import). For an especially detailed chapter on
constitutional limitations to substantive criminal law, including cases on vagueness, the First
Amendment, substantive due process protections for abortion and same-sex intimacy, and
the Eighth Amendment, along with a section on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
see Gerald G. Ashdown, Ronald J. Bacigal & Adam M. Gershowitz, Criminal Law: Cases and
Comments 271-443 (10th ed. 2017).
120. As Jody Armour has argued, American legal education both emphasizes mens rea
as a "requirement" and obscures the ways in which mens rea determinations are likely to be
shaped by racial bias. See Jody Armour, Where Bias Lives in the Criminal Law and Its
Processes: How Judges and Jurors Socially Construct Black Criminals, 45 Am. J. Crim. L.
203, 205 (2018) ("Those trained in American law schools have learned to think about the
mens rea requirement in ways that conceal its central role as a vehicle for factfinders to
make frontal moral judgments of wrongdoers.").
121. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. On mens rea specifically, which fig-
ures prominently throughout the curriculum, commentators outside the classroom have
faulted the MPC and criminal law more broadly for "talking about a criminal's mental state
as though such a mental state were a real, let alone discoverable, condition." Francis X.
Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D.Jones,Joshua D. Greene & Rene Marois, Sorting Guilty
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again, although many scholars would claim that the gap between model
and reality is a pathology that developed in late twentieth-century America,
a review of criminal law before the dawn of our current curricular model
suggests otherwise.2
There is one more way in which the criminal law curriculum creates
a false impression of constraint in substantive criminal law, not so much
by directly naming doctrines of purported constraint as by misrep-
resenting the structure and scope of existing law. I refer here to the heavy
reliance on the MPC and the related technique in some casebooks of
depicting American criminal law as structured around two alternatives:
either the MPC or "the common law."123 Students are then instructed, and
tested, on law in "MPC states" and "common law states." Outside the case-
books, several commentators have pointed out that there is no such thing
Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1306, 1317 n.37 (2011) (citing critics of the MPC). While empirical
researchers are often straightforward about the uglier aspects of criminal law in practice,
the collapse of normative or evaluative claims and positive description is a longstanding
problem among criminal law theorists. At midcentury, aspects ofJerome Hall's Theft, Law,
and Society were criticized by his contemporaries in this regard, leading him to argue in later
work that criminal law contained certain immanent "principles" that it only sometimes re-
alized in practice. Hall argued that a scholar, even a scientific one, could reasonably identify
those principles and state them as "is" rather than "ought." See Jerome Hall, Science and
Reform in Criminal Law, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 787, 790-92 (1952) [hereinafter J. Hall, Science
and Reform]; see also J. Hall, Theft, supra note 111, at xvii-xviii ("It is also possible to
generalize regarding selected recurrent phases of such situations and to correlate them with
significant variables .... In this way valid empirical generalizations regarding past problem-
solving processes can be discovered.").
122. On legality as aspiration rather than reality even early in the twentieth century, see
J. Hall, Theft, supra note 111, at xvii. On the presumption of innocence as aspiration in the
same time period, Livingston Hall notes that "presumptions of guilt ... were not unknown
to the common law" and presumptions erved as "prosecutor's friend[s]." L. Hall, The
Substantive Law of Crimes, supra note 111, at 648-51. He cited constitutional due process
as a partial, but inadequate, constraint on the use of these devices. Id. at 649-50. On
culpability requirements in that era, see id. at 641-46; see also Puttkammer, supra note 66,
at 388 (noting that under existing law, criminal liability could be based on act or omission,
and either could be "accompanied by any conceivable frame of mind ... ranging from the
most specific of intents to complete absence of thought"); L. Hall, Book Review, supra note
111, at 848 (describing Hall's "new" theory of a mens rea requirement).
123. See Luis E. Chiesa, Substantive Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Comparative
Materials, at xxvii (2014) [hereinafter Chiesa, Substantive Criminal Law] (emphasizing that
the book highlights contrasts between "the MPC approach" and "the common law ap-
proach"); Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at viii (" [T]he casebook emphasizes the Model Penal
Code, in part so that students have ample opportunity to work with an integrated criminal
code."); Dubber & Kelman, supra note 107, at vii ("Paulsen/Kadish (and later
Kadish/Schulhofer) was the first casebook based on the Model Penal Code and has set the
standard for American criminal law teaching ever since."); Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59,
at 157 ("But since 1962, more than half of the states have enacted modern criminal codes
that draw heavily on the MPC, so many state codes look like the MPC."); Lee & Harris 4th,
supra note 108, at 5 (noting that definitions of crimes and principles of interpretation
depend on "whether one is in a jurisdiction in which the code principally follows the




as "an MPC state," since even the states that have codified substantial parts
of the MPC have also codified a huge range of other statutes and modified
MPC concepts through either legislative or judicial adjustments.124 Mean-
while, "common law state" seems to be an ill-defined umbrella term for
any state that has not adopted sufficient portions of the MPC.125 To the
extent there ever was a "common law of crimes," it was a sprawling
collection of judicial decisions from different jurisdictions that did not
yield one single set of rules.126 Consequently, there was no single "common
law" of crimes even before nineteenth-century codification movements.
The MPC-versus-common-law paradigm has been adopted in classrooms,
and on bar exams, not because it is an accurate representation of positive
law but because it is simple and therefore testable.12 7
But there are ideological effects to this choice of pedagogical
convenience. The juxtaposition of the MPC and the (imagined) common
law as America's two alternatives suggests two closed and coherent
"systems."128 This obscures from students one important reason that the
legality principle does not operate as a constraint on criminal law: Actual
criminal codes are sprawling arrays of disorganized, ambiguous, and
overlapping statutes, layered on top of each other and potentially
applicable to a wide range of ordinary conduct.12 9 If we wanted to assess
124. Anders Walker, The New Common Law: Courts, Culture, and the Localization of
the Model Penal Code, 62 Hastings L.J. 1633, 1646 (2013) [hereinafter Walker, The New
Common Law] (highlighting that no state has adopted all of the MPC and that even the
states that adopted portions still amended the MPC's definitions with new legislation); see
also James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 Yale L.J. 1679, 1696
(1991) (suggesting that an "honest" course description of criminal law would say: "Study
common law crimes that haven't been the law anywhere for more than 100 years. Then, to
bring things up to date, study the Model Penal Code, which is not the law anywhere today.").
125. Walker, The New Common Law, supra note 124, at 1636-37 (critiquing the term
"common law state").
126. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
59, 63 (2004) (contesting the "myth" that the American colonies inherited a clear felony
murder rule from England); id. at 65 (noting nineteenth-century distaste for "a general
American common law of crimes" and development of state-specific homicide laws).
127. For a slightly different view that nonetheless recognizes the pervasive influence of
the MPC, see Franklin E. Zimring, Is There a Remedy for the Irrelevance of Academic
Criminal Law?, 64 J. Legal Educ. 5, 5 (2014) ("The beautifully articulated language and
commentary of the model code provides introductory students with an almost statutory
presentation of the doctrines. It is a rich and challenging curriculum for teachers and
students."). For more on the significance of the bar exam, see infra section II.E.
128. C. Sara Mayeux, The Idea of "the Criminal Justice System", 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
55, 56-57 (2018) ("It is thus taken nearly universally for granted that in the United States
there exists something called 'the criminal justice system,' a unitary, integrated set of
component institutions, processes, and actors.").
129. See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 112, at 635 (noting that "[t]he main form of
degradation [of penal codes] is the proliferation of numerous new offenses that duplicate,
but may be inconsistent with, prior existing offenses"); id. at 640 (suggesting that the
"fundamental advance" achieved by the Model Penal Code "is often lost in what seems to
be a willy-nilly rush to maintain a continuous stream of new offenses").
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realistically the MPC's effect on constraining discretion and vindicating
the principle of legality, we would not ask how many states have codified
some of the MPC but rather how many states have codified only the MPC.
And the answer is zero.130
B. Punishment Theory as Carceral Ideology
In addition to emphasizing the ways that criminal law is constrained,
the curricular model launched by Michael and Wechsler makes an
affirmative case for the good that criminal law can achieve. Michael and
Wechsler embedded that argument into their introductory chapter, but
since Paulsen and Kadish published the first edition of their casebook in
1962, most criminal law casebooks have included a substantial separate
section on punishment theory, usually in the first or second chapter.131
This section examines the function of punishment theory in the criminal
law curriculum.
In most casebooks, four broad justificatory theories-retribution, de-
terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-are duly presented as
possible rationales for all the doctrines that will follow. None of the four
theories (consider them the four horsemen of the carceral state) is
presented in enough detail or with sufficient background evidence to
allow students to assess meaningfully whether criminal punishment
actually does serve the purported goal.132 Indeed, the appropriateness of
punishment is often presented as self-evident; students are asked to
consider why punishment is justified, not whether.133 And they are provided
130. See Walker, The New Common Law, supra note 124, at 1646 (noting that no state
adopted the MPC in its entirety and those states that did adopt significant portions of the
MPC have supplemented their codes with other legislation).
131. See Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59, at 57-89; see also Dressler 8th, supra note 82,
at 31-90 (Chapter Two: Principles of Punishment); Dubber & Kelman, supra note 107, at
1-85 (Chapter One: Punishment and Its Rationales); Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note 117, at
29-113 (Chapter One: The Purpose and Limits of Punishment); Lee & Harris 4th, supra
note 108, at 6-38 Justifications for Punishment); Ohlin 2d, supra note 119, at 21-49
(Chapter Two: Punishment).
132. Of course, claims that a punishment is deserved or serves retributive ends are not
falsifiable, but the other purported aims of punishment could in theory be tested
empirically.
133. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 81 ("Punishing wrongdoers for their
misconduct seems self-evidently appropriate. But this straightforward idea becomes
complex and controversial when we seek to apply it to actual cases, because there are many
distinct reasons why punishment of wrongdoers may be appropriate."); see also id. at 96
("Debate about... [philosophical] justifications sometimes seems purely academic,
because both retributive and utilitarian purposes often appear self-evidently sound and
mutually reinforcing."). An important exception here is the Lee and Harris casebook, which
includes a lengthy excerpt of Robert Blecker's argument that penal philosophies do not
justify the actual experience of American incarceration. See Lee & Harris 4th, supra note
108, at 20-31 (excerpting Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison:
Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149 (1990)); see also Dressler &
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little recourse to answer this question other than some vocabulary to
dignify any prior pro-punishment intuitions they may hold.134
What is the goal in including in the course this smattering of punish-
ment theories? Casebook authors sometimes emphasize that the vocabu-
lary of punishment purposes is important to the practice of criminal law
because practitioners and judges use this vocabulary to make arguments
about specific rules or for particular sentencing outcomes.135 More
broadly, punishment theories are often presented as another source of
limits on criminal law: No punishment is valid unless it is supported by at
least one of the four horsemen.136 Indeed, after Wechsler's MPC was
embraced by the academy as answering all the big questions about the
content of the substantive criminal law, criminal law theorists turned most
of their attention to punishment theories, working out the best statement
of retributivism (usually) and arguing that it could serve as a limiting
principle to keep criminal law in check.137 To keep things interesting, a
Garvey 8th, supra note 82, at 35 (suggesting that determinists who deny all human
responsibility might argue for abolition of punishment).
134. The most extreme xample of the intuition-priming pedagogical approach is Paul
Robinson's casebook, now with coauthors. Paul H. Robinson, Shima Baradaran Baughman
& Michael T. Cahill, Criminal Law: Case Studies and Controversies (4th ed. 2017). The book
is built around case studies carefully designed to "tell [] the full story of the case leading up
to the offense in a way that is likely to trigger people's intuitions of justice." Id. at xxxv.
135. See, e.g., Dubber & Kelman, supra note 107, at 2 ("Every day, judges-and
sometimes juries-must decide whether a particular person before them deserves
punishment, and if so, how much and in what form. To make these decisions, they turn to
the various rationales for punishment for guidance."); Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at
6 ("These moral justifications for punishment are not only discussed by theorists, but are
frequently used by policymakers in public debate and by attorneys and judges in legal
proceedings to evaluate the efficiency and fairness of the criminal justice system.").
136. This point is made more explicitly in academic journals than the casebooks
themselves. But Kadish did emphasize blame as a limiting principle in an essay explaining
his pedagogical approach to substantive criminal law. See Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal
Law, supra note 93, at 10 ("It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment
entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may notjustly be imposed where the person
is not blameworthy."); see also Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note 117, at 32 ("[R]etributivism
serves both as a limiting principle (there must be no undeserved punishment) and an
affirmative justification for punishment (desert justifies punishment).").
137. For an overview of this theoretical turn, see Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and
Sentencing Reform, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1293, 1298-306 (2006) [hereinafter
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy]. Wechsler himself was a pluralist about punishment purposes,
and the original MPC reflected various consequentialist theories without endorsing a single
approach. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code,
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 465, 468-69 (1961) (describing the theories of punishment that are
considered in the MPC). Three decades later, when mass incarceration was well underway,
the American Law Institute would decide that the Code's failure to adopt retributive prin-
ciples more explicitly was a shortcoming that required amendments to the MPC. See Kevin
R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 525, 528 (2002) ("The new ordering of sentencing purposes recommended
for the revised Code is an adaptation of Norval Morris's theory of limited retributivism,
under which considerations of desert establish upper and lower limits upon penalties in
specific cases . . . ").
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few contrarians kept defending deterrence or other consequentialist ac-
counts.138 Theorists on each side would argue that their preferred theory
constrains the penal law while other theories permit or even require too
much punishment.
But if scholars, or teachers, hoped that attention to punishment
theory would limit the scope of American criminal law, they have clearly
been disappointed.139 And the failure ofjustificatory theories to serve as
constraints should not surprise us. Articulating the justification of a
practice, especially in the deeply moral terms that retributive theory tends
to use, is unlikely to foster restraint among those who engage in that prac-
tice.14o Moreover, as some casebook authors do acknowledge, the intense
scholarly preferences for one specific theory over others are rarely shared
by policymakers and legal authorities.1 41 To the extent that punishment
purposes do surface in policy discussions or judicial opinions, the usual
approach is the kitchen sink, in which the proposed sentence or punitive
policy is found to serve both retributive and consequentialist ends.14 2
My focus so far in this section has been on the chapter, or subsection,
in criminal law casebooks that is specifically devoted to punishment
theories. But there is another, more subtle way in which the criminal law
course nourishes a pro-carceral outlook rather than a perspective capable
of deep critique of existing criminal institutions. Even after Michael and
Wechsler's innovation to add non-judicial materials to the criminal law
curriculum, cases are the primary source through which students learn
positive law. Judicial opinions certainly are a source of positive law, but
they are also a source of normative indoctrination. The persons who write
appellate opinions tend to believe in the legitimacy of the system in which
they work and wield power, and their opinions are built on "a rhetoric of
justification. "143 Thus, teaching through cases ensures that most of what
138. For a brief literature review, see R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work
in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 Crime &Just. 1, 4-9 (1996).
139. C. Jonathan Simon, Teaching Criminal Law in an Era of Governing Through
Crime, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 1313, 1316 (2004) [hereinafter Simon, Teaching Criminal Law]
(noting that punishment heories do not determine the operation of criminal laws or the
distribution of punishment). Recently, some criminal law scholars have urged professors to
"teach abolition" alongside theories of punishment. See Amna Akbar, Teaching Penal
Abolition, Law & Pol. Econ. Blog (July 15, 2019), https://peproject.org/blog/teaching-
abolition [https://perma.cc/9RN9-FLR4]. For further discussion of teaching from a more
critical perspective, see infra section II.E.
140. See Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 1017, 1037 (2014) [hereinafter
Ristroph, Just Violence] ("[The] focus on justifying punishment has served no better to
limit punishment than the focus on justifying war served to limit war .... "); see also
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 137, at 1308-13 (discussing the concept of desert
as elastic and ill-equipped to limit punishment).
141. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 12 (noting that judges asked to
choose among theories of punishment will often choose "all of the above").
142. See id. at 11-12.
143. Again, unless we are to assume malevolence or bad faith, we should presume that
the judges who have rejected defendants' resistance to charges or punishment in case after
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students read will be written by individuals who are likely to hold a
distinctively strong commitment to the legitimacy of criminal prosecutions
and punishment. At the same time, judicial opinions assume what Robert
Ferguson has called "the monologic voice," so that the individual judge as
a subjective being with possibly idiosyncratic preferences is made to
disappear.14 4 Of course, Michael and Wechsler were well aware that a diet
of appellate cases could produce a strong bias in favor of existing law; that
was part of their motivation to mix cases with extrajudicial materials.14 5 But
the materials they added, and most of the extrajudicial materials included
in contemporary casebooks, also tend to assume the legitimacy and justice
of standard criminal sanctions, including prison.14
One final word on punishment heory and the case method: By asking
students to apply their favorite justifications of punishment to particular
cases, the criminal law course encourages the view-clearly evident in the
James Comey passage that launches this Essay-that the justice of
punishment is a question to be answered one person at a time. 147 The
course may occasionally mention sentencing patterns or the broad social
costs of punishment, but those glimpses at a systemic overview are far
overshadowed by the relentless inquiry, in case after case, into the
culpability of an individual defendant.148 As Markus Dubber has observed,
the "focus on the individual case has come at the expense of systematic
justice" and has obscured issues of equality in criminal law.1 49 And the
distortion that comes by focusing on individual cases is all the more
pronounced if the individual cases are carefully curated to highlight the
most violent and serious offenses. The next section considers the
pedagogical choice to depict criminal law primarily through homicide and
rape cases.
case, millions of times, believe they are acting justly and fairly. In any case, judges certainly
write as though they believe themselves to be acting justly. See Randy D. Gordon, How
Lawyers (Come to) See the World: A Narrative Theory of Legal Pedagogy, 56 Loy. L. Rev.
619, 635 (2010) ("Lawyers become so accustomed to reading appellate opinions for rules
that it is easy for them to forget how narrowly those opinions are cast-e.g., they have a
limited purpose, are subject to powerful generic constraints, and are built on a rhetoric of
justification, not description.").
144. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J.L. & Humans.
201, 207 (1990).
145. See Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law, supra note 58, at 1-2.
146. An important exception is the Blecker excerpt in Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108,
at 20-31.
147. Comey, supra note 1, at 150.
148. Moreover, the presentation of data on overall sentencing patterns, especially racial
disparities, may be affirmatively harmful if students are not given tools to understand the
sources of those disparities. See infra section II.D.
149. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Historical Analysis of Criminal Codes, 18 Law & Hist.
Rev. 433, 439 (2000).
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C. "All the Deepest Injuries "
A substantive criminal law course supposedly focuses on the def-
initions of crimes. It purports to teach students something about what
kinds of conduct are criminalized, as well as the form and structure of the
prohibitions. But so many kinds of conduct are criminal that a teacher
must choose which specific offenses to examine. This section examines the
substantial focus on homicide in American criminal law courses-not o
argue that the syllabus should strive to capture all types of crime, but rather
to ask what ideological work is done by the choice to prioritize homicide.
I suggest that the emphasis on homicide-with some supplemental atten-
tion to rape-reflects and seeks to propagate the view that criminal law's
primary function is to address deeply harmful acts, especially interpersonal
violence. This claim about criminal law's function is a normative one, not
a description of actual practices, and the normative claim obscures the
many ways in which criminal law operates to subordinate individuals who
have not inflicted great harm upon others.
1. Interpersonal Violence. - For more than half a century, American law
schools have shown students only a tiny slice of the vast range of conduct
defined as criminal by state and federal penal codes. The slice is not a
random sample, and it is certainly not representative. As discussed above,
one of the major innovations of Michael and Wechsler's 1940 casebook
was its focus on homicide and deprioritization of other criminal
offenses.150 Though Kadish and other successors include some materials
on other specific offenses, usually rape and theft, homicide remains the
paradigm crime in American pedagogy.151 It is not just that casebooks'
discussions of specific offenses give greater weight to homicide than other
offenses. Casebooks also frequently use homicide cases to teach an array
150. See supra Part I.
151. Two casebooks depart from the homicide/rape/and-maybe-theft model. The most
recent edition of Ashdown et al. includes a full chapter on drug possession and distribution,
and another chapter on drunk driving and texting while driving. See Ashdown et al., supra
note 119, at 871-950. The most recent edition of Hoffmann and Stuntz contains chapters
on drug crimes and gun crimes. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 399-486 (drug
crimes); id. at 535-90 (gun crimes). Both of these casebooks also include lengthy discussions
of federal criminal law. See Ashdown et al., supra note 119, at 191-205, 213-51; Hoffmann
& Stuntz, supra note 104, at 233-97 (chapter on federal criminal law). Since relatively few
federal prosecutions involve physically violent crime, the inclusion of federal law further
shifts the focus from the homicide paradigm. It is also worth noting here one less widely
used casebook with a roughly equivalent emphasis between property crimes and homicide.
See Myron Moskovitz &J. Amy Dillard, Cases and Problems in Criminal Law (7th ed. 2018).
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of other topics, including mental states,152 the purported act require-
ment,153 omissions,154 accomplice liability, 155 and inchoate offenses.156
Causation-an issue that arises almost solely in homicide cases157-is often
given its own chapter, thus expanding further the emphasis on homi-
cide.158 Meanwhile, most casebooks include few if any materials on the
nonviolent offenses that constitute the vast majority of criminal prosecu-
tions.159 For example, possession offenses generate far more convictions
than charges of interpersonal violence, but possession stays mainly in the
shadows of most casebooks.160
152. See Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at 211-12 (presenting State v. Fugate, 303
N.E.2d 313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), which noted that intent to kill may be presumed where
death is the natural and probable consequence of defendant's action, and affirmed a
conviction for first-degree murder and armed robbery).
153. See Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 224-26 (presenting People v. Newton, 87
Cal. Rptr. 394 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), which reversed a manslaughter conviction on grounds
that the trial court refused to instruct the jury on unconsciousness as a defense). The Kadish
casebook does not mention the racially charged context of this case: The defendant was
Huey P. Newton, cofounder of the Black Panthers, charged with murdering a police officer
after a conflict during a traffic stop. See Laurie Levenson, Cases of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 585, 594 n.25 (2000).
154. See Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note 117, at 124-26 (presenting Jones v. United States,
308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962), which reversed a conviction for involuntary manslaughter
due to inadequate jury instructions).
155. See Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 895-98 (presenting State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d
1067 (Me. 1987), which upheld a conviction for murder as an accomplice).
156. See id. at 831-34 (presenting People v. Swain, 909 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1996), which
reversed a conviction for conspiracy to murder on grounds of inadequate jury instruction
on the required mental state).
157. See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 180 (2001) (noting that most
causation questions arise in homicide cases).
158. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 227-50 (presenting chapter on causation
with homicide cases). Breaking this mold is Hoffmann and Stuntz's casebook, which pre-
sents a wide array of offenses and gives relatively little emphasis to homicide. This book
embeds the doctrinal material on causation within its single chapter on homicide. See
Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 705-28. Chapters on affirmative defenses are also
typically full of homicide cases, in part because self-defense and insanity claims seem to arise
most often in homicide prosecutions. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 516-71
(presenting homicide and attempted homicide cases in which the defendant raised self-
defense or defense of others); id. at 654-66 (presenting homicide cases in which the
defendant raised insanity).
159. But see supra note 151 (discussing Ashdown et al. on drugs and driving offenses,
and Hoffmann & Stuntz on drug and gun crimes). To be sure, homicide and other serious
offenses are more likely to generate appeals and thus appellate opinions. But the case
method can't be blamed for the overwhelming focus on homicide in most casebooks. See
supra note 66.
160. Some of the leading teaching cases are possession cases, but they are presented to
teach other issues-often, nuances of mens rea analyses-rather than to examine the law of
possession per se. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 280-87 (using two drug
possession cases, United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007), and United States
v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), to explore the concept of "willful blindness" in mens
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Nor is it enough, for some casebook authors, simply to include lots of
homicide cases. The particular murder and manslaughter cases selected
are often particularly gruesome or disturbing-for example, victimized
children are a recurring theme.161 Joshua Dressler, acknowledging criti-
cism of some of the graphic depictions of child abuse in his casebook, has
defended his choices as "pedagogically useful": "The problem, of course,
is that any class covering Criminal Law is replete with awful crimes, so there
is no sensible way to protect readers from this reality, nor should we."1 6 2
This reasoning, however, is circular. Classes in criminal law are "replete
with awful crimes" if teachers and casebook authors choose to focus on
awful crimes-if they choose homicides of children rather than drug
possession, sexual assault rather than disorderly conduct, contract killings
rather than shoplifting.
I do not think casebook authors pick the most violent cases (merely)
to provoke or excite their students.163 The selective presentation of
offenses reflects and perpetuates a view of criminal law as a necessary social
response to inflictions of grave harm or injury upon persons. That was
Herbert Wechsler's view of criminal law, reflected in his casebook and in
his agenda for the MPC: "Whatever views one holds about the penal law,
no one will question its importance in society. This is the law on which
men place their ultimate reliance for protection against all the deepest
injuries that human conduct can inflict on individuals and institutions."16 4
rea analysis); id. at 309-11 (presenting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), a gun
possession case, in a section on strict liability and statutory analysis).
161. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 228-32 (presenting Oxendine v. State, 528
A.2d 870 (Del. 1987), which reversed a father's manslaughter conviction for beating his son
to death, but sustaining the conviction for the lesser included offense of assault); id. at 275-
77 (presenting Midgett v. State, 729 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987), which reversed a first-degree
murder conviction for insufficiency of evidence but finding adequate evidence of a second-
degree murder in the prosecution of a father who beat his eight-year-old son to death); Kadish et
al. 10th, supra note 59, at 517-20 (presenting Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox. Crim. Cas. 311 (1887)
(Eng.), which offered instructions on the felony murder doctrine in a prosecution of a
father for setting a fire that killed his disabled son); Ohlin 2d, supra note 119, at 281
(presenting People v. Kolzow, 703 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), which upheld a
manslaughter conviction of a woman who left her infant unattended in her car); id. at 263
(presenting People v. Snyder, 937 N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div. 2012), which upheld a mother's
conviction for depraved indifference murder of her toddler daughter). Almost every
criminal law casebook includes State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971),
which affirmed manslaughter convictions for a couple who failed to seek medical attention
for their seventeen-month-old baby. In my experience, many students are sympathetic to
the defendants in Williams, as are, I suspect, many casebook authors. But the occasional
presence of a sympathetic defendant does not undermine the observation that homicides
and child victims are featured prominently in criminal law pedagogy.
162. Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, supra note 82, at 1149 n.18.
163. Dressler does, however, gesture at these goals. See id. at 1148-49 ("[M]any of my
Criminal Law students do not come to the class expecting to be excited, even though (or is
it because?) it involves the rawest material-for example, cannibalism, euthanasia, rape,
tragic abuse of children, and the like.").
164. Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1098.
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This passage served as the epigraph to the first edition of Paulsen and
Kadish's casebook and is still featured prominently in the Introduction of
the latest edition.16 5 Other casebooks, without necessarily quoting
Wechsler, similarly suggest that criminal law is concerned primarily with
the infliction of deeply injurious and wrongful behavior: "Criminal law
forces us to wrestle with how we define and differentiate between different
degrees of evil." 166 Casebooks thus reflect and present to students the view
that criminal law is uniquely necessary and important because it is the only
adequate response to a unique set of gravely injurious behaviors.167 On this
view, homicide is the paradigm crime. If there is a second offense that
deserves substantial attention in a course about "all the deepest injuries"
that humans inflict on one another, sexual assault fits the bill. 168
2. The Rest of (Actual) Criminal Law. - Speaking descriptively rather
than normatively, is criminal law best understood as an effort to address
violence or "the deepest injuries" that humans inflict on one another?
Homicide offenses occupy a miniscule fraction of actual criminal codes,
and actual homicides generate an even smaller percentage of actual
criminal prosecutions.169 Even if we move beyond homicide and think of
all offenses that involve the infliction of physical injury, we still capture
only a tiny fragment of criminal law's concerns.7 0 And even if we think of
injury in terms of property loss or nonphysical harm to a victim, we still do
not capture the huge number of criminal laws that do not involve any
individual victim at all.171 This interest in much more than "the deepest
injuries" is not a new development or a pathology of late twentieth-century
165. See Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at xxxii; Paulsen & Kadish, supra note 59, at
vii.
166. Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 118, at 1; see also Ohlin, Changing Market,
supra note 59, at 1155 ("Criminal law is a nasty business .... A book or article about
criminal law often reads like a parade of horribles, an indictment of humanity's descent into
moral weakness.").
167. Beyond the casebooks, scholars too often claim that without criminal law, humans
simply wouldn't be able to develop and inculcate norms of fair treatment of one another.
See, e.g., J. Hall, Science and Reform, supra note 121, at 787 (asserting "the paramount
role" of criminal law and suggesting that criminal law shapes "basic attitudes which deter-
mine whether decency and respect for human beings are realities or mere pretensions").
168. Susan Estrich writes that [w]e spent what seemed an eternity on homicide" when
she was a law student in 1974, but her criminal law class did not address rape. Susan Estrich,
Teaching Rape Law, 102 Yale L.J. 509, 509 (1992). Thanks in no small part to Estrich herself,
more teachers began covering the subject and most casebooks now include a chapter on
sexual assault. See id. at 514-16.
169. C. Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 571,
573 & n.6 (2011) [hereinafter Ristroph, Shadow of Violence] (gathering empirical evidence
on rates of violent offenses).
170. See id.
171. See supra note 160 (discussing possession offenses); infra notes 174-177 and ac-
companying text (discussing public order offenses).
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overcriminalization.1 72 Indeed, by the numbers, criminal law is used much
more often to manage petty disorder and low-level disruption than to
respond to physical violence of any type.173 Like invocations of a legality
principle or a desert constraint on punishment, the claim that criminal law
is focused on "all the deepest injuries" is best understood as an aspiration,
a claim about the way that criminal law should be used. But to state this
claim in descriptive terms, in the context of a course that focuses heavily
on homicide cases, serves to buttress support for criminal legal interventions.
Again, the point is not that the syllabus of a criminal law course should
precisely mirror patterns of actual criminal statutes or actual conduct, but
that we should ask what ideological work is done by the choice to prioritize
homicide and rape and exclude other offenses. Even as criminal law is
depicted as a necessary response to grave physical violence, the relative
inattention to low-level offenses prunes from students' views much of the
arbitrariness and discrimination that characterizes actual enforcement. A
homicide prosecution is subject to some real constraints, starting with the
need to identify an actual victim. There is no similar constraint on
prosecutions for disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, or an array of
other public order offenses.174 Note that vagrancy appears in most criminal
law casebooks only as a bygone misstep, supposedly excised from American
law by the Supreme Court.175 Most casebooks do not mention vagrancy's
sordid history as the mechanism of convict leasing, through which
southern states preserved "slavery by another name" for decades after the
172. In other words, the suggestion that criminal law is concerned primarily with hom-
icide and like crimes was a misrepresentation from the moment it first entered American
pedagogy. Published shortly before Michael and Wechsler's casebook, Livingston Hall's
1937 review of "the substantive law of crimes" over the prior fifty years begins by
emphasizing the broad and growing scope of conduct prohibited. Areas of specific growth
from 1887 to 1936 included crimes against government; regulation of business; banking and
finance; food, drug, and liquor regulation; and automobile regulation. L. Hall, The
Substantive Law of Crimes, supra note 111, at 619-36; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text (describing the wide range of offenses presented in casebooks published
before 1940).
173. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 280-81 (2011) ("Contrary to
popular belief, however, the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are not
felonies. They are misdemeanors: 'minor' dramas played out in much higher numbers every
day in lower courts across the country."). Of course, the point is not that humans don't
often mistreat each other, and gravely, but that grave mistreatment of another person is
neither necessary nor sufficient for a criminal intervention.
174. C. Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in The New CriminalJustice Thinking
71, 77-79 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (arguing that, for the most
severe offenses such as homicide, "the criminal justice system can assert with a straight face
that it proceeds according to rule and is centrally motivated by the culpability of
defendants," but that no similar claim is plausible with regard to misdemeanors).
175. Several casebooks include Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972),




Civil War, 176 nor do most books address in detail vagrancy laws' new
manifestations.177 Similarly, loitering appears in the course only to be
struck down by the Supreme Court.178 Here some casebooks do at least
acknowledge that Chicago promptly reenacted its loitering statute and has
so far avoided another successful constitutional challenge.79 Even so, the
relegation of this information to a few notes, especially in light of the
casebooks' overall focus on homicide, suggests that there is a missed
opportunity to study more fully the ongoing use of public order offenses
as a mechanism of discriminatory enforcement.180 Low-level offenses are
the bread and butter of criminal law, but they all but disappear from a
course that teaches criminal law as a response to "the deepest injuries"
that humans can inflict.
The course's focus on homicide, with the occasional foray into sexual
assault, also means that drug and gun crimes do not receive sustained
attention.181 That omission helps a pro-carceral ideology in at least two
176. See generally Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslave-
ment of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War 11 (2008). I have located only
one direct reference to vagrancy's connection to convict leasing in a criminal law casebook.
Hoffmann and Stuntz note that the history of vagrancy law is "scandalous" and quote a
footnote from City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 n.20 (1999), that references the
post-Civil War use of vagrancy. Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 41. The latest edition
of Dressler's casebook adds a new note that vagrancy was used "to place limits on the actions
of freed slaves," but then adds, "This should not obscure the fact, however, that lawmakers
can have legitimate public safety or health concerns [that] might run afoul of legality prin-
ciples." Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 114. As an apparent illustration of these "legitimate
public safety and health concerns," the next case addresses the prosecution of homeless
persons for living in their automobiles. See id. at 114-20.
177. Demonstrating what we might call MPC blinders, one casebook asks whether it is
still possible to draft a constitutionally valid vagrancy law, and then asks students to consider
the MPC's proposed loitering statute. See Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note 117, at 189-90. But
the question posed is not hypothetical, and it has not gone unanswered. As states quickly
discovered, they could enact new vagrancy laws that would survive constitutional challenge
by adding an additional element of criminal purpose or apparent threat. See Sarah A. Seo,
The New Public, 125 Yale L.J. 1616, 1660 (2016) (describing the vagrancy statute that
Florida enacted in the wake of Papachristou); T. Leigh Anenson, Comment, Another
Casualty of the War ... Vagrancy Laws Target the Fourth Amendment, 26 Akron L. Rev.
493, 499-506 (1993) (detailing the "surprising vitality" of vagrancy laws after Papachristou).
In a world of plea bargaining, these additional elements rarely pose an obstacle for
prosecutors. See Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors
Cross the Line?, 17 Nev. L.J. 401, 416 (2017) (recognizing that "[t]here are few rules
dictating how prosecutors should approach the plea bargaining process").
178. Several casebooks include or mention Morales, 527 U.S. 41. See, e.g., Dressler 8th,
supra note 82, at 120; Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 185-93; Ohlin 2d, supra note 119,
at 104-08.
179. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 50-51; Kadish et al. 10th, supra
note 59, at 195-97; Ohlin 2d, supra note 119, at 109. But see Dix, supra note 108, at 84-100
(presenting Morales without mentioning the reenactment of the gang loitering statute).
180. Lee and Harris do include a substantial discussion of the discriminatory enforce-
ment of low-level offenses. See Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at 76-100.
181. As noted above, there are two important exceptions. See Ashdown et al., supra note
119, at 871-904; Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 399-486, 535-90.
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ways, each related to distinct but overlapping phenomena evoked by the
term "mass incarceration." First, and most importantly, drug and gun
offenses are a crucial site of enforcement discretion and a source of pro-
found racial disparities. This is because drug and gun offenses are often
charged as possession offenses.182 Possession offenses are not quite as easily
manipulated as public order offenses, since they do require evidence of
contraband possessed. But the criminalization of objects and substances
commonly held-such as marijuana-has meant that possession offenses
also leave enforcers with wide discretion and opportunities to discrimi-
nate, so much so that one commentator has called possession "the new
vagrancy."183 Excluding gun and drug crimes from the course is thus
another mechanism to obscure the realities of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. It is a missed opportunity to explain, rather than simply
gesture toward, the stark racial disparities in America's prison population.
Second, the failure to include gun and drug offenses in the standard
criminal law curriculum makes it more difficult for students to appreciate
and understand the sheer scale of the carceral state. Recall that "mass
incarceration" is sometimes used to describe the broad, cross-racial
expansion of the American legal system rather than the specific racial
disproportionalities in that system.114 Across racial groups, though more
for nonwhites than for whites, prosecutions for drug crimes (including not
only some possession offenses but also manufacturing or distribution of-
fenses) contributed substantially to America's exponential prison growth
over the twentieth century.185 Gun crimes play a lesser but still important
role, especially in the federal system, where gun offenses are second only
182. See Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2173, 2199-207 (2016)
(discussing opportunities for enforcement discretion in gun and drug possession offenses).
183. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829, 908 (2001) [hereinafter Dubber, Policing
Possession]; see also George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 202-03 (1978) (discussing
the underlying philosophy of possession offenses as "an invitation to a class-oriented
criminal law [that] could even support the introduction of racist criteria into the definition
of offenses").
184. See supra note 19.
185. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 399 ("[M]ore Americans are
incarcerated for drug crimes today than were incarcerated for all crimes back in 1980."). To
be sure, drug prosecutions are not the sole explanation for the increase in prisoners. John
Pfaff has argued that changes in prosecutorial charging practices are more important than
the War on Drugs in explaining mass incarceration, but he does not deny the substantial
effect of drug offenses.John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and
How to Achieve Real Reform 14 (2017) [hereinafter Pfaff, Locked In]; see alsoJohn F. Pfaff,
Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison Growth Is
Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 265, 265 (2014) ("[T]he




to drug offenses among the categories of crime that produce prison sen-
tences.186 Ultimately, then, the curricular focus on homicide and rape, and
a corresponding neglect of drug and gun crimes, makes it possible to teach
an entire course on American criminal law without a detailed discussion
of mass incarceration. To the extent mass incarceration has finally made
an appearance in criminal law casebooks, it is typically mentioned in a
brief aside187 or, worse, depicted as a perplexing development that must
not unsettle the notion that criminal law is a necessary response to those
who inflict "all the deepest injuries."188 Substantive criminal law casebooks
offer relatively little insight into the causes of mass incarceration and racial
disparities, for reasons explored in the next section.
D. Erasing the State
I have so far emphasized relatively easily identifiable ways in which the
criminal law curriculum distorts or misrepresents criminal law to make it
seem more rational, more necessary, and less arbitrary or discriminatory.
This section identifies a more subtle, and more complicated, way in which
the curriculum may contribute to pro-carceral policies and practices. The
very conception of "substantive" law that underlies the course obscures
from view the fact that law always requires human agents to operate,
interpret, and enforce it. When we obscure law's human agents, we may
also obscure their flaws and limitations, or patterns of bias in their actual
decisions. Racial bias is a property of humans-and an unmistakable
property of the criminal law that humans have implemented and operated
in the United States-but he curricular model of substantive criminal law
is color-blind.
As Part I notes, substantive law is often characterized across legal fields
as the law that describes the rights, duties, and obligations of private
parties, while procedural law addresses the obligations and powers of
public officials as they seek to enforce substantive law.189 Applied to
186. See Levin, supra note 182, at 2213 (2016) (noting that in 2013, more federal
prisoners were sentenced on weapons charges than any other category of crime save drug
offenses).
187. See, e.g., Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note 117, at 21-27 (devoting a few pages to a
discussion of incarceration rates and their relation to crime rates).
188. For example, the latest edition of Kadish's casebook begins with a section on "the
sweep of criminal law in America," but the issues raised there are almost entirely absent
from the rest of the book. See Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 1-7. Moreover, this section
on mass incarceration is careful to emphasize the importance of criminal sanctions for some
offenses: "Behavior like murder, rape, burglary, and theft remains all too common, and any
well-ordered society will respond to such conduct with criminal sanctions." Id. at 5. And the
section ends with questions about underenforcement and the admonition that "[t]he chal-
lenge is to ensure that stronger enforcement tools-when needed-are deployed fairly, and
not just in favor of individuals and groups that are already advantaged." Id. at 7.
189. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. Herbert Wechsler probably did not
originate this account of the substance/procedure distinction, but he helped promulgate it
in his celebrated federal courts casebook. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The
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criminal law, this substance/procedure divide means that substantive
criminal law includes general principles of liability as well as definitions of
individual crimes.190 Because statutes and formal statements of doctrine
are typically facially race-neutral, so too is the substantive criminal law.191
The actions of state officials, such as police officers or prosecutors, are
relegated to the separate realm of criminal procedure. Or, as Part I
suggests, substantive law is law with its human interpreters and enforcers
(and their biases, racial or otherwise) erased from the picture.192 This, I
suggest, makes criminal law seem more trustworthy and more appealing
as a response to social problems.
I offer a couple of examples to make the theoretical claim more
concrete, but first, a point of clarification: Only some of the many humans
who participate in criminal law are erased by the curricular model.
Humans as makers of law are not entirely invisible to the usual conception
of substantive law. Developed at a time of increasing codification in crimi-
nal law, the idea of substantive criminal law as a discrete and independent
Federal Courts and the Federal System 678 (1953) (defining "substantive" law as "those
rules . . .which characteristically and reasonably affect people's conduct at the stage of pri-
mary private activity").
190. See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2,
at 8 (1986) ("The substantive criminal law ... includes the definition of specific offenses
and general principles of liability.").
191. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev.
841, 873 (1997) ("[A]lthough the substantive criminal law is color-blind, it favors some
groups over others."). Butler's more recent work suggests that he would no longer
characterize the substantive criminal law as color-blind. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is
Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J.
1419, 1445-46 (2016) [hereinafter Butler, The System Is Working] ("[T]he law is suffused
with racial hierarchy . . .. By avoiding the traps of false objectivity and colorblindness,
reformers can use the law to achieve racial progress."); see also, e.g., Justin Murray,
Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for
Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1541,1580-81 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Reimagining]
("[C]olor-blind analyses of the criminal-justice system... assume that the substantive
criminal law is race neutral, and that the only place where racism has room to maneuver is
in . . . enforcement . . .. This assumption should be rejected because institutional racism
excludes minorities from democratic political processes .... ").
192. See supra text accompanying note 48. I use the language of erasure deliberately,
following critical race theorists who have used a play on words to critique purported color-
blindness in the law as a mechanism for preserving racial inequality. See, e.g., Devon W.
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946, 968-69 (2002) ("The
Supreme Court's investment in colorblindness . . . suggests that people of color are under-
protected even as they are over-policed. In effect, from the perspective of many people of
color, the Fourth Amendment has been eraced." (footnote omitted)). My claim is that the
erasure of the state from conceptions of substantive criminal law has obscured, and thus
protected from scrutiny, several different sources of profound racial inequalities. As Justin
Murray has argued, racism in the criminal law is not limited to the enforcement decisions
typically characterized as "procedure"; institutional racism affects the law we call "substan-
tive" as well. See Murray, Reimagining, supra note 191, at 1563-64 (describing psychological
research that has shown that people's preferences for criminal law and punitive policies are
affected by their subconscious racial biases).
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field does not foreclose acknowledgment of the role of the legislature and
its (human) members.193 Indeed, as Part I discusses, Michael and Wechsler
imagined their new criminal law course as a training ground for wise
legislators or policymakers.194 To the extent that a criminal law course asks
students to critique existing statutes or doctrines, it must at least implicitly
acknowledge law as a human construction that is thus subject to design
errors. 195
But Wechsler-like many of his contemporaries and many of ours-
believed that, with the right effort, humans could construct laws better
than themselves.196 This belief may be implicit in the phrase "the rule of
law" at least so far as it is juxtaposed to the rule of man. The suggestion is
that laws can be designed to operate without preference, bias, misper-
ception, or other human failings. Wechsler believed that law could be
rendered rational and neutral-that we could, ultimately, erase all or most
human fingerprints from the law.197 This vision shapes the Model Penal
Code and his commentary on it, and it still shapes much of the contempo-
rary course in substantive criminal law.198 Legislators are humans, it is true,
but the hope is that with reasoned deliberation humans can devise the
right legislation, a substantive law free of human frailty.
Humans as makers of law are thus occasionally visible in the substan-
tive criminal law curriculum; with much more regularity, humans as
breakers of law are visible front and center. A criminal law course is all about
human failings-of defendants. Much of the course is framed as an inquiry
193. See supra note 41.
194. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
195. Cf. Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at 2 (describing criminal law as "a system of
cultural meaning" that changes with time and identifying various specific actors who shape
the law).
196. Wechsler's commentary on the MPC illustrates his hope to inspire rational laws
that avoided the occasional irrationalities of actual humans. See Wechsler, The Challenge,
supra note 49, at 1097-100 (advocating for a model penal code to comprehensively reex-
amine penal law and fix its substantive defects because substantive criminal law must be
"rational and just"); Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on
Its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956) [hereinafter Wechsler, Some Obser-
vations] (describing existing penal codes as "fragmentary, old, disorganized and often
accidental in their coverage," and expressing hope that a model penal code could address
these difficulties).
197. See Herbert Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 19 (arguing that judi-
cial review does not render a court "a naked power organ" so long as its decision is "entirely
principled," or based on "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved"). Lloyd Weinreb has speculated that Wechsler might
make a slightly different claim-that "we must proceed as ifrationalization is possible"-
whether or not it is. Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 289.
198. See Wechsler, Some Observations, supra note 196, at 321 ("We hope to provide a
reasoned, integrated body of material that will be useful in [legislative reform]."); id. at 394
("If we have erred in the details, we do submit at least that the philosophy is right.");
Wechsler, The Challenge, supra note 49, at 1098-101 (" [T]he differences [in criminal law
across states] . . . call for exploration of the bases of competing views and some attempt to
aid the rationality ofjudgment on the issues.").
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into human responsibility-of defendants, not public officials. The recur-
ring question is how an objective, neutral law should assess the failings of
the flawed beings who inflict deep injuries on other vulnerable beings.
Students are presented with terrible events and asked how to allocate
responsibility for those events among private parties, but they are not
typically asked to think about state actors'responsibilities for either the ter-
rible events or for the legal responses to it.19 9 So my claim of erasure is
specific. The human agents who operate the criminal law-as police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, probation supervisors, and prison
administrators-are mostly erased from the substantive criminal law
curriculum. This erasure allows the law itself to be depicted as an objective
institution free of human frailty. It allows us to pretend that "the rule of
law" is distinguishable from the decisions of individual men (and women).
Perhaps most importantly, the erasure of state actors allows the myth that
"substantive" criminal law is color-blind.
Two concrete examples concern topics where state enforcement
interests-and the possibility of racial bias-have loomed in the back-
ground without being fully addressed by the curricular canon. Affirmative
defenses and inchoate offenses both involve doctrines driven by public
concerns such as perceived enforcement needs or efforts to protect the
legitimacy of public institutions. These doctrines are mechanisms of struc-
tural inequality: They are specific points at which racialized judgments of
permissible and impermissible violence are made manifest.200 In several
casebooks, the shadow of race already appears with respect to each of these
subjects. It is the curricular handling of race that I wish to emphasize here:
Rather than confronting the question of racial judgment within "sub-
stantive" criminal law itself, in teaching affirmative defenses and inchoate
offenses the curriculum portrays racial bias as the property of an errant
individual (preferably, the defendant). In these topics, the course keeps
the primary emphasis on an analysis of the defendant's individual subjec-
tive responsibility and avoids any broader suggestion that legal institutions
themselves are a source of racial inequality.
Take, first, affirmative defenses. These selective reprieves from crim-
inal liability, such as self-defense and necessity, are mechanisms by which
political institutions share-or refuse to share-their discretionary pow-
ers, including the power to use violence.201 When Bernhard Goetz is ac-
199. See Ristroph, Responsibility for the Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 109 ("[A]n
account of criminal responsibility must not rest with attributions of responsibility for indi-
vidual criminal acts; it must address collective responsibility for the criminal law itself.").
200. To be clear, I do not suggest hat these doctrines are the only such points in crim-
inal law. Rather, the point is that these doctrines are points at which racialized judgments
are particularly difficult to conceal, and hence the shadow of race has already entered the
curricular presentation of affirmative defenses and inchoate offenses.
201. See V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1691, 1702-15 (2003) (discussing self-defense and necessity doctrines in terms of "an ...
economy of relations between citizens and their state"); Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications,
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quitted of attempted murder after shooting at Black teenagers, and after
testifying that he wanted to "murder" them, the state has retroactively
granted Goetz a license to use violence against those he finds sufficiently
threatening-a license that echoes the state's own discretionary powers.202
This political and institutional account of justification defenses yields
important insights into other old casebook favorites such as State v.
Norman,203 and also the newer (to casebooks) topic of law enforcement
justifications as a rationale for not prosecuting police officers who kill
unarmed suspects.204
The fact that race shapes judgments about danger and threat is
impossible to ignore with regard to both Goetz and police killings, and for
these topics, casebooks do often ask students to think directly about racial
bias in legal decisionmaking.205 Particularly noteworthy is the casebook
coauthored by Cynthia Lee and Angela Harris, which draws on Lee's
scholarship to highlight the legal concept of "reasonableness" as inevitably
racialized.206 Other casebooks are more circumspect. But having glimpsed
this possibility of racial bias within the law itself, most casebooks then seek
to reassert the color-blind paradigm by returning the focus to doctrinal
analysis of a defendant's subjective culpability. Thus the overall depiction
of justification defenses suggests that they do (or should) involve close
legal inquiries into the minds of defendants, not that these legal inquiries
will themselves be shaped by race, nor that justification defenses are a
mechanism by which society chooses, sometimes along racial lines, to allow
one defendant and not another to avoid conviction.
The second example addresses attempt and other inchoate offenses.
Attempt can be a frustrating topic for students and teachers alike, because
the cases resist logical, principled explanations, and both statutory and
doctrinal efforts to define an attempt are maddeningly imprecise.207 The
Powers, and Authority, 117 Yale L.J. 1070, 1110 (2008) (arguing that justification defenses
are a kind of political authorization that permit an individual to "exercise ... a legal
power . . . [to decide] whether or not otherwise prohibited conduct is justified under the
circumstances").
202. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 44 (N.Y. 1986).
203. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
204. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 937-45; Kaplan et al. 8th, supra note
117, at 594-601.
205. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 878-81 ("Notes on Self-Defense and
Race"); id. at 936-45 (emphasizing racial disparities in uses of force by police).
206. Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108; see also Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable
Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom 4-6 (2007) [hereinafter Lee, Reasonable
Man] (examining how unconscious racism influences perceptions of criminality).
207. See, e.g., Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 641 ("Statutory definitions of the
crime of attempt are usually minimal."). Scholars' frustration with attempt doctrine seems
to have been considerably greater before the promulgation of the MPC; now it seems that
many criminal law specialists believe (wrongly, in my view) that the MPC has offered a clear
and rational definition of a crime of attempt. For an example of the pre-MPC view, see John
S. Strahorn, Jr., Preparation for Crime as a Criminal Attempt, 1 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 1
(1939) ("Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's
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frustration may arise from trying to put the square peg of public
enforcement interests into the round hole of private moral responsibility.
Attempt is not best understood as an independent crime with its own mens
rea and actus reus-notwithstanding the depiction of it in just those terms
in many a casebook-which then leads students to write confused exams
that struggle with the impossible question whether a defendant is guilty of
attempt in the abstract, without reference to the specific offense that was
attempted.208 Instead, attempt doctrine is a way to expand the scope of
criminal liability previously established by independently defined offenses.
This expansion of liability is not driven primarily by a determination that
preparation for a crime is sometimes (but exactly when?) blameworthy,
but rather by a determination that sometimes it is appropriate for
enforcers to intervene even though they cannot establish a violation of
some preexisting statute.209 What it takes to expand liability depends upon
the courts' assessments of law enforcement interests in a particular case.
Attempt doctrine is thus a departure from the principle of legality, and
before Wechsler and Kadish imposed their vision of substantive criminal
law, the doctrine was sometimes explicitly praised for just that reason.2 1 0
Cases about inchoate crimes can reveal the shadows of the
enforcement officials otherwise banished from a course on "substantive"
law, as evident in the discussions of McQuirter v. State2l found in several
stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to
express when . . . preparations to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt threat.").
208. See, e.g., Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 759-70 (identifying the mens rea and
conduct elements of attempt); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 490 (same).
209. See Michael T. Cahill, Inchoate Crimes, in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law
512, 515 (Markus Dirk Dubber & Tatjana Hornle eds., 2014) (developing an "intervention-
based" account of attempt and showing that it better explains existing doctrine than other
theories).
210. See Thurman Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40
Yale L.J. 53, 76 (1930) [hereinafter Arnold, Criminal Attempts] (characterizing attempt
doctrine as a power "to extend the policy or limits of any particular criminal prohibition"
when the courts feel it is appropriate to do so (footnote omitted)); id. at 79 (claiming that
the "very vagueness [of attempt law] has been its salvation, for it makes it possible to arrive
at good results in many cases"). Of course, Arnold wrote not only before Wechsler, but also
before authoritarian regimes in Germany and Russia notoriously rejected legality in favor
of the power to impose "punishment by analogy," or convictions for conduct analogous but
not quite identical to conduct proscribed by existing law. See, e.g., Preuss, supra note 111,
at 847 (1936) (quoting the newly enacted "punishment by analogy" section of National
Socialist law and concluding that "the principle nulum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ... has
been abolished"). A desire to distinguish U.S. law from such provisions was surely part of
American scholars' motivation to emphasize legality during and immediately after World
War II. Occasionally one still finds an acknowledgment that attempt doctrine operates
largely through principles of analogy. See, e.g., Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal
Attempts-Legality and the Legal Process, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 665, 674 (1969) ("Because
attempt is a relational crime-it is defined in relation to the statutorily defined substantive
crime allegedly attempted-there is available a judicial technique for deciding individual
cases, namely the technique of analogy.").
211. 63 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
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casebooks.212 In McQuirter a state court affirms the conviction of "a Negro
man" for the crime of "an attempt to commit an assault with intent to
rape."213 The charge and conviction were based upon the facts that Mr.
McQuirter had walked near a white woman on a public street, in a manner
that she found threatening, and on police testimony (denied by the de-
fendant) that the defendant had confessed to an intent to commit rape.21 4
In upholding the conviction, the Alabama court held that criminal intent
could be established by consideration of "social conditions and customs
founded upon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white
woman and defendant was a Negro man. "215
Police officers had to arrest McQuirter and report his supposed con-
fession; a prosecutor had to pursue charges. But the Kadish casebook
directs our attention not to the legal professionals, but to the lay jury,
implying that juror bias led to an improper outcome.21 6 Moreover,
although this case illustrates starkly the possibility that human enforcers
or adjudicators will act upon all-too-human biases, the Kadish casebook
suggests that the problem can be solved with better substantive law, such
as an "equivocality" test for attempts.217 No doubt different legal definitions of
attempt may create more or less discretion, but it seems highly unlikely
that an inquiry into (un) equivocality will be immune from racial bias.
Rather, for some enforcers, bias is exactly what will make a Black man's
guilt seem unequivocal.
To the extent that different substantive definitions of attempt and
other inchoate crimes give enforcers and adjudicators varying degrees of
discretion, the MPC moves toward more discretion, not less.218 In a turn
212. See Dressler 8th, supra note 82, at 751; Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 657-
58.
213. McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 388.
214. Id. at 389.
215. Id. at 390.
216. Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 658-59. The Kadish casebook's use of Bennett
Capers's work is notable here and illustrative of the curricular effort to defend a color-blind
account of substantive criminal law. Capers uses McQuirter and other cases to identify what
he calls "the white letter law of rape"-rules and principles that disappear from official view,
like white text on a white page, but nonetheless enshrine racial bias into substantive law.
Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1345 (2010). According to
Capers, McQuirter is useful as a rare case where this white letter law becomes black letter,
and therefore visible. See id. at 1385. The Kadish casebook quotes Capers's article, but only
for the proposition that the evidence supported an acquittal. See Kadish et al. 10th, supra
note 59, at 658-59 (quoting Capers to highlight the troublesome "context of racial bigotry"
in the case). Neither this section on McQuirter, nor the separate chapter on rape law in
Kadish, mentions or addresses "the white letter law of rape" or Capers's broader challenge
to the image of law as color-blind.
217. Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 659 (stating that an equivocality test-or an
inquiry into "how clearly [the defendant's] acts bespeak his intent"-"would foreclose
conviction in a case like McQuirter').
218. See Luis Chiesa, The Model Penal Code, Mass Incarceration, and the Racialization
of American Criminal Law, 25 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 605, 650 (2018) [hereinafter Chiesa,
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that many scholars and casebook authors depict as progressive, the MPC
made the defendant's actions less important, and the defendant's mental
state more important, to the definition of attempt.29 But since mental
states are typically attributed rather than "proved" in any scientific sense,
doctrines heavily focused on mental states are more prone to manipu-
lation by legal decisionmakers.220 The expansive discretion afforded by
inchoate offenses has played a significant role in the construction of the
carceral state, as evidenced by the frequency with which drug and gun
crime prosecutions are based on attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy
charges arising from undercover or "sting" operations." But these dimen-
sions of inchoate offenses are underemphasized in or sometimes entirely
absent from criminal law casebooks. Again, that omission appears to be a
result of the conception of substantive criminal law as rules for private
individuals, with state officials excised from the picture.222
Racialization of American Criminal Law] (" [T]he ideas that led to the enactment of the
Model Penal Code make it easier for racially prejudiced judges and juries to justify reaching
outcomes that discriminate against black defendants.").
219. See id. at 608-09 (noting that the MPC's focus on culpability was originally
considered progressive); Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm:
Balancing the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 283, 306-
07 (1988) (detailing the increased focus on the defendant's mental state in the MPC's
definition of attempt).
220. See Fletcher, supra note 183, at 119, 233 (contrasting "manifest criminality" and
"subjective criminality," and noting that the latter, because it relies more heavily on claims
about mental states, "generates concern about the dangers of convicting the innocent");
see also supra notes 106,117 (discussing ways in which legal "proof" differs from mathemat-
ical or scientific proof); supra note 121 (noting that mental states are not actually concrete,
discoverable facts).
221. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Partic-
ipation in Crime, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 175-76 (2009) (discussing the MPC approach to
inchoate offenses as part of a trend toward "removing barriers to conviction in the under-
cover context"); Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34
Cardozo L. Rev. 1401, 1441-51 (2013) (explaining several undercover policing techniques
in which officers encourage defendants to commit particular criminal conduct in order to
expose them to longer, and often mandatory, prison sentences); cf. Chiesa, Racialization of
American Criminal Law, supra note 218, at 649 (arguing that "the Code's approach to
inchoate crimes and possession offenses facilitated the casting of a 'vast net of mass
incapacitation' by providing lawmakers and courts with an expansive array of 'mechanisms"'
for intervention by enforcement officials (quoting Dubber, Policing Possession, supra note
183, at 992)).
222. An example will also reveal the ways in which criminal law scholars depict law one
way in the journals and another in the casebooks. Luis Chiesa has published a powerful
critique of the MPC's approach to inchoate offenses and the effects of that approach on
enforcement officials and adjudicators. See generally Chiesa, Racialization of American
Criminal Law, supra note 218. But Chiesa's own criminal law casebook offers a fairly tradi-
tional presentation of attempt that focuses on "the conduct element" and "the subjective
offense element (mens rea)," and includes only one brief note on enforcement implica-
tions. Chiesa, Substantive Criminal Law, supra note 123, at 331-70; see also id. at 349 ("The
fact that the Model Penal Code's substantial step test generates attempt liability earlier than
the common law proximity tests has important consequences for the police.").
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Thus, human enforcers and adjudicators-and the ways these hu-
mans may be influenced by bias, irrationality, or political and social con-
cerns unrelated to the particular defendant-are mostly invisible in a
course in substantive criminal law. This erasure of the state and its human
agents generates a more sanguine depiction of criminal law. It trains new
lawyers to indulge the fantasy of a self-executing law that vindicates
individual freedom, a law that follows its own objective and neutral
principles and never functions, in Wechsler's term, as a "naked power
organ."223 All of this makes criminal law much more palatable. It makes
the choice of a criminal sanction seem a much safer option.
One more observation deserves emphasis. As the previous section
notes, many casebooks in recent years have added some acknowledgment,
often in their opening pages, of mass incarceration and the profound
racial disparities in American criminal law.22 4 But most of the content
between the book covers presents a legal framework in which mass
incarceration and racial disparities should never have arisen-most of the
curriculum suggests that criminal law is color-blind and subject to
constraints. Thus, casebooks acknowledge the fact of racialized mass incar-
ceration but do not offer an explanation of the phenomenon. The lack of
an adequate explanation, I suggest, stems from the separation of substance
and procedure, and the corresponding exclusion of state officials from
most discussions of substantive law. 225 Teachers and scholars should
consider the impact of mentioning, but failing to explain, grave racial
disparities among incarcerated persons in a course that repeatedly
emphasizes the careful operation of criminal law. By failing to look closely
at the human agents of criminal law who have directed criminal sanctions
along racial lines, the curriculum runs the risk of reinforcing perceptions
of Black criminality.226
E. Casebooks: The Medium and the Message
In the preceding discussion, I have identified several pro-carceral
messages that are fairly consistent across criminal law casebooks, though I
have tried also to note the occasional departures from the norm. Here I
want to shift focus from the message to the medium and offer reflections
223. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 19.
224. See supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
225. C. Peller, supra note 46, at 2234 (arguing that "the process-substance filter for
analyzing criminal law," along with an "integrationist" ideology of color-blindness, have "se-
verely limit[ed] the range of critical discourse about the interplay of race and criminal law").
226. In the decades after the Civil War, white Americans across the nation, including
political leaders, social scientists, and other elites, constructed an association of Black
Americans with criminal behavior that has shaped American law and society ever since. See
Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making
of Modern Urban America 1 (2010) (" [T] he statistical language of black criminality ... is
the glue that binds race to crime today as in the past.").
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on ways in which the medium through which criminal law is taught-the
casebook-makes it more difficult to change the messages in the course.227
The law school casebook is "truly a unique American creation,"228 and
predictions of its demise in an age of electronic media have so far fallen
short.229 Legal educators in other countries have traditionally preferred
treatises or independently curated teaching materials.230 Unlike teaching
materials assembled by an individual instructor for one's own course,
casebooks are a commodity. They are fairly expensive to produce, and
while there is a captive market for them, there is sufficient competition in
the casebook market to create some constraints on casebook authors.231
Fields of law develop their own canons, and once established, a canon
exerts a strong gravitational pull. 232 An unorthodox approach is risky, for
unless it gains converts quickly and changes the canon (as did Michael and
227. C. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 7-8 (1964)
(introducing the claim that "the medium is the message").
228. Douglas W. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Early Casebook Publishing, 96 Law Libr.
J. 95, 95 (2004).
229. See Joseph Scott Miller & Lydia Pallas Loren, The Idea of the Casebook: Pedagogy,
Prestige, and Trusty Platforms, 11 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 31, 32 (2015) (noting that
conventional casebooks have not become "toast" as thought possible more than a decade
ago (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert Laurence, Casebooks Are Toast,
26 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2002))).
230. In the 1990s, however, some European educators-inspired by the American
example-sought o develop a series of casebooks on "the common law of Europe." See
Mauro Bussani, Current Trends in European Comparative Law: The Common Core
Approach, 21 Hastings Int'l & Compar. L. Rev. 785, 787-88 (1998).
231. See Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the
Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 1141, 1145-46
(2002) (noting that law professors assign casebooks to "captive audiences" and the market
for casebooks is "highly competitive"). Authors need to appeal to law professors (and not
directly to law students, though of course professors may take student interests or pref-
erences into account). While a professor could in theory choose a casebook in order to
"teach against" it, as discussed below, it is much more likely that they will choose one that
presents the subject in line with her own views. See infra notes 240-244 and accompanying
text.
232. C. Introduction, in Legal Canons 1, 6 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Legal Canons] ("Law professors also rely on anthologies,
though we call them 'casebooks.' Indeed, it is safe to say that no part of the academy relies
more on anthologies than do American law schools."). Interestingly, even the arrival of
platforms that allow professors to self-publish e-casebooks has led to relatively few changes
in the content of casebooks. See Miller & Loren, supra note 229, at 39. Moreover, new
professors are specially likely to pick an already established casebook, and then there is
strong path dependence. Id. at 44-45. Finally, as I have noted, scholarly canons and
pedagogical ones can diverge. Robert Weisberg's essay for the Legal Canon's volume begins
with the suggestion that Blackstone asked "all the key questions" about substantive criminal
law and answered them about as well as we are able to answer them now. Robert Weisberg,
Criminal Law, in Balkin & Levinson, Legal Canons, supra, at 130,130-31. But the remainder
of Weisberg's essay discusses scholarship that considers the constructed nature of crime,
unanswered (and unanswerable) questions about agency and free will, the use of the
criminal law to further racial or class subordination, and the limits of human and legal
rationality. Id. at 132-52. The pedagogical canon has not tackled most of these issues.
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Wechsler's book, which was certainly unorthodox when first introduced),
it will not survive in the market.233 Casebooks are thus likely to generate
uniformity of thought. They make it less likely that scholars and teachers
will depart from the canon or disagree about what constitutes the canon.
I do not want to suggest that evolution is impossible. As mass incar-
ceration and racial disparities have gained more public attention, some
casebooks have made important adjustments to the pedagogic model that
Wechsler developed and Kadish refined. Kadish's own casebook now has
a full chapter on discretion, though it is tucked at the end of the book.234
The importance of enforcement discretion is referenced by some other
authors as well, most prominently Joseph Hoffmann and William Stuntz,
and Cynthia Lee and Angela Harris.235 Indeed, the explicit aim of
Hoffmann and Stuntz is to reorient the study of criminal law away from
moral philosophy and toward "the political economy of criminal justice-
the complex relationships between the key institutional players (legisla-
tures, prosecutors, police, judges, and juries) that share responsibility for
defining, interpreting, and applying criminal law." 236 As noted above,
some books now include some empirical information on incarceration
rates and patterns of racial disparity, and two books now feature drug
crimes prominently.237
233. Here it is worth noting a couple of ghosts of casebooks past-books that rejected
many of the premises of the Michael and Wechsler model and have now gone out of print.
Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein & Richard D. Schwartz, Criminal Law: Problems for
Decision in the Promulgation, Invocation, and Administration of a Law of Crimes (1962)
(emphasizing criminal law as a social construct and an instrument of social control, and
presenting extensive psychiatric and clinical resources to suggest alternatives to criminal
law); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Criminal Law: Cases, Comments, Questions (7th ed. 2003). Both of
these books begin with a "case file"-a varied array of legal documents, transcripts, news
reports, and other materials related to a single criminal prosecution. As it happens, both
books use cases with child victims for these files, in keeping with the interest in child victims
noted above. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text. But overall, the legal theory
underlying each of these books is quite different from that underlying Michael and
Wechsler, Kadish et al., and most other criminal law casebooks. Weinreb described the
differences between his approach and Wechsler's as jurisprudential rather than
pedagogical" and explained that he rejected Wechsler's assumption "that the criminal law
is-or should be and could be-a product of reason." Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law,
supra note 35, at 283-84.
234. Kadish et al. 10th, supra note 59, at 1179-262.
235. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2-3 (discussing enforcement discretion
and the resulting racial disparities in criminal law); Lee & Harris 4th, supra note 108, at 81-
100 (same).
236. Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 104, at xxi.
237. See supra notes 151, 187-188 and accompanying text; cf. Sharon Dolovich,
Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. Legal Educ. 218, 218-19 (2012) (urging law schools to
incorporate "the administration of punishment" into their curriculum). See generally Taja-
Nia Y. Henderson, Teaching the Carceral Crisis: An Ethical and Pedagogical Imperative, 13
U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 104 (2013) (assessing the state of casebooks on
criminal law, criminal procedure, and sentencing, and suggesting ways to incorporate the
topic of mass incarceration into the standard law school curriculum).
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But I do not think these developments do much to undercut the pro-
carceral messages outlined in the previous four sections. To be clear, this
Essay identifies a sin of commission, not merely one of omission.
Discussions of discretion, mass incarceration, and racial disparities appear
too much like accessories added as afterthoughts-which, for the most
part, they have been.238 That allows the unattractive aspects of contem-
porary criminal law to be seen as bugs, not features, or as newly developed
pathologies that may yet be excised with a still-better model penal code or
the right constitutional decision from the Supreme Court. But the use of
criminal law to police a wide range of ordinary conduct, the broad discre-
tion of enforcers, and patterns of bias in enforcement are not twentieth or
twenty-first century novelties.239 What changed in the second half of the
twentieth century was the scope and frequency of criminal interventions,
not the fact of discretion or the failure of criminal law to live up to its
promise of legality. Meanwhile, the criminal law curriculum has taken
some small steps to acknowledge the existence of discretion and discrimi-
nation, but it retains the same underlying conceptual model that has failed
to contain discretion and discrimination for more than half a century.
Finally, I want to revisit an assumption made at the outset of this Part:
The content of casebooks serves as a roughly accurate guide to what is
actually taught in criminal law classrooms. It is possible, after all, to "teach
against" a casebook.240 Or at least, it is possible to try. A teacher can use
lectures and class discussion to question aspects of the written assignment.
Sometimes the order of assignments or the pairing of cases in an
unexpected way can generate insights; sometimes one can use a case to
illustrate a point other than the one the authors intended.24 Michael and
238. Moreover, even if one or two casebooks are less pro-carceral than most, this has
little impact overall if those casebooks are not widely adopted.
239. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 1952 ("[O]ther key
phenomena associated with a contemporary crisis have in fact been attributes of American
criminal law since the early days of the republic."); Ristroph, What Is Remembered, supra
note 34, at 1163-70 (noting that policing and criminal law as a tool of racial control have
been present in American society long before the twentieth century).
240. See, e.g., ArielaJ. Gross, Teaching Humanities Softly: Bringing a Critical Approach
to the First-Year Contracts Class Through Trial and Error, 3 Calif. L. Rev. Cir. 19, 20 (2012)
(recounting advice from senior colleagues "to assign a 'plain vanilla' casebook, and then
teach against he casebook").
241. For example, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (Eng.), appears
in nearly every casebook to generate discussions about the purposes of punishment and the
necessity defense, but it is also a stark example (albeit a dated one) of nonadherence to the
principle of legality. Dudley and Stephens were prosecuted for murder after cannibalizing
a fellow sailor while stranded at sea without other food or water. Id. Their act, while tragic,
was also consistent with the "custom of the sea" at that time, except that they chose the
weakest and sickest sailor to kill rather than drawing lots. See A.W. Brian Simpson,
Cannibalism and the Common Law: The Story of the Tragic Lost Voyage of the Mignonette
and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which It Gave Rise 60-66 (1984). The public and
even the dead sailor's family were largely sympathetic to Dudley and Stephens, but the
English court condemned them to death. Although the court mentioned the failure to draw
lots, that fact did not appear to be dispositive; rather, the court wanted to change the
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Wechsler designed a casebook to enable students to readjudicial opinions
critically, and a teacher can similarly encourage students to read the
casebook itself critically. A teacher can highlight and scrutinize ideological
claims or presuppositions; they can ask what is left out or what is going
unsaid.242 They may choose to omit particular topics, such as punishment
theory, in order "to avoid ... inoculating lawyers, some of who will be
legislators, prosecutors, and judges, with the conviction that American
punishment is under the control of law and thus more or less both
democratic and rational."243 Unsurprisingly, teaching against a casebook
is a method that may be more common among faculty inclined to critical
perspectives.244
A related option is to use a casebook but decline to rely upon it to
frame the structure or even much of the content of the course. In a
thoughtful "Guerilla Guide" to teaching criminal law, Amna Akbar and
Jocelyn Simonson discuss several "ways to broaden and deepen the dis-
course in the classroom when teaching first-year Criminal Law. "245 Their
suggestions include expanding the discussion of punishment theory to
include more information that could enable skepticism about the wisdom
and justice of criminal sanctions; giving greater attention to race, gender,
and class; and "shortening or eliminating some traditional areas of the
course and replac[ing] them with criminal law subjects that affect the lives
of more people," such as misdemeanors and drug laws.24 6 For over a year,
these suggestions and others have been actively discussed among a nation-
wide group of professors loosely organized as "decarcerationlawprofs."247
Casebook tables of contents notwithstanding, at least some professors are
engaged in a campaign of collective subversion, telling students after each
applicable law. See id. at 240; see also Nourse, supra note 201, at 1715 (" [T]he court was
worried that the 'custom of the sea' was . . . too easily subject to abuse . . . . [H]istory tells us
that the case was constructed for the precise purpose of announcing a new rule that would
change the 'custom of the sea."').
242. See Melissa Murray, Teaching Gender as a Core Value: The Softer Side of Criminal
Law, 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 525, 526-29 (2011) (noting that "men predominate in most
criminal law casebooks . . . [while] women are notable in their victimhood," and suggesting
ways to introduce discussions of gender (and race) into the course).
243. Simon, Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 139, at 1316.
244. And perhaps also more common among women faculty. See Deborah Waire Post,
Outsider Jurisprudence and the "Unthinkable" Tale: Spousal Abuse and the Doctrine of
Duress, 26 U. Haw. L. Rev. 469, 471 n.11 (2004) (noting, in a discussion of teaching from a
critical perspective, that the author had "heard colleagues, mostly women, talk about the
fact that they teach against the casebook").
245. No. 2: Criminal Law, Guerrilla Guides to L. Teaching (Aug. 29, 2016), https://guer
rillaguides.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/crimlaw [https://perma.cc/5GZV-ACHT] [here-
inafter Criminal Law, Guerrilla Guides]; see also Jocelyn Simonson & Amna Akbar, Rethink-
ing Criminal Law, LPE Project (Oct. 24, 2018), https://peproject.org/blog/rethinking-
criminal-law [https://perma.cc/KM7H-X6Z9].
246. See Criminal Law, Guerrilla Guides, supra note 245.
247. Email from Valena Beety, Professor of L. & Deputy Dir. of the Acad. for Just., Ariz.
State Univ., to author (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:46 PM EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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casebook assignment: But be aware, it isn't really like that at all, and it never
has been.
As much as I endorse this decarceral pedagogy, I believe that it will
have little long-term effect without an overhaul of the underlying cur-
ricular material. First, the casebooks themselves will continue to shape the
way many professors teach and think, as suggested by the remarkable con-
tinuity in content as new criminal law casebooks and new editions of old
casebooks come to market.248 Note that today's faculty were educated in
the same canon that they now teach. Criminal law scholarship suggests that
most faculty members still embrace the canonical account of criminal law
as a worthy ideal, even if they recognize that current conditions do not
correspond to that ideal (and thus should be seen as a "crisis").249 But even
as some faculty have recognized and tried to counter the pro-carceral
messages in the very materials that they have asked students to read,
teaching against a casebook is not usually effective.250 Law is a field where
written texts matter a great deal, even if they do not determine everything.
A casebook sets "the tone of the course" in a way that is difficult to
disrupt.21 In addition, it is difficult to explain to students why they are
being asked to read several hundred pages of a seemingly authoritative
text (perhaps after having spent a couple hundred dollars on said text)
when it is not, in fact, trustworthy.
There is one more important factor that may contribute to uniformity
among casebooks and in the law school curriculum: the Multistate Bar
Exam (MBE), which did not exist when Michael and Wechsler launched
the modern criminal law course, but which now incorporates some aspects
of their model.252 To be sure, the correlation between current casebooks
and the bar exam is often overstated; the bar exam also tests pretend law,
248. For the anecdotal evidence, I am relying on discussions of criminal law pedagogy
at large academic conferences over the past three years.
249. See, e.g., Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 2004-07 (explaining how
the legal academy came to see criminal law as "in crisis"). For more on the potential
divergence between the scholarly canon and the pedagogical canon, see supra note 232;
infra Part IV.
250. See Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional
Responsibility, 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 37, 39 (2001) (noting that efforts to
teach against the prevailing construction of professional responsibility have "marginal ef-
fect"); Ellen Dannin, Teaching Labor Law Within a Socioeconomic Framework, 41 San
Diego L. Rev. 93, 96 (2004) ("Any teacher who has had the misfortune of having to teach
against the casebook knows just how powerful a hold the text has on the tone of a course.");
Post, supra note 244, at 471 n.il (noting that teaching against a casebook is not an effective
pedagogical method).
251. Dannin, supra note 250, at 96; see also Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 231, at 1149
(noting that when a professor tries to cast a judicial opinion as "the viewpoint of a lunatic
fringe," students are likely to see the case as more authoritative and "the professor begins
to look like the one on the lunatic fringe").
252. See Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433, 464 n.98
(1989) (noting that the MBE was introduced in 1973).
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but it's not exactly the same pretend law that casebooks emphasize.253 All
the same, the overlap between the conception of criminal law in today's
curriculum and the conception on the MBE is substantial. Whether law
school courses do or should "teach to the bar exam" is, of course, a matter
of debate. But any faculty who do feel a responsibility to prepare their
students for the bar exam may feel constrained in how much they can
depart from Wechsler's model.
Criminal law scholars who do not want to deliver pro-carceral
messages need more than a tweaked casebook or a clever lecture plan.
Ultimately, as Deborah Waire Post observed: "[C]ritical perspectives require
more than reflection on the content of the canon. Critical perspectives
require us to reconceive and reconstruct the canon."254 That is certainly a
project too big to complete in this Essay, but I sketch an initial framework
in Part IV. Before I take up that effort, though, Part III specifies a bit more
carefully the pathways by which the criminal law curriculum is likely to
affect criminal legal practices.
III. A LAW SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE?
Among the many causes of mass incarceration identified by scholars,
legal education has not so far taken a turn on the stage. This Part offers a
few reasons to think that the curricular model Part II describes did have
some effect on the many small steps and choices that have added up to
mass incarceration.255 To recap, that model begins with the premise that
substantive criminal law is separate and distinct from enforcement practices.256
The model further teaches that substantive criminal law is bound by a
principle of legality and other constitutional constraints, including a
presumption of innocence and a due process requirement that guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; crimes are defined according to a
logical structure that includes necessary components such as mens rea and
actus reus; and criminal law is a necessary mechanism to address "the
deepest injuries" that individuals inflict on one another, especially and
notably acts of extreme physical violence such as homicide and rape.257
These claims are the canons of substantive criminal law.
At the outset, a few caveats about claims of cause and effect seem
important. First, mass incarceration, whether understood more narrowly
253. See Daniel J. Solove, The Multistate Bar Exam as a Theory of Law, 104 Mich. L.
Rev. 1403, 1406 n.10 (2006) (" [I]f one practiced the criminal law on the Bar Exam, one
might be disbarred.").
254. Post, supra note 244, at 471.
255. See James Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black
America 45 (2017) ("Mass incarceration is the result of small, distinct steps, each of whose
significance becomes more apparent over time, and only when considered in light of later
events.").
256. See supra Part I.
257. See supra Part II.
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as the increase in incarcerated Americans or more broadly as a vast
expansion of both custodial and noncustodial criminal law interventions,
is a historical transformation unlikely to be easily explained with a simple
model.258 Note also that the most likely explanations for the growth in the
prisoner population may not also be the best explanations for the overall
expansion of all criminal interventions, both custodial and noncus-
todial." And finally, I take some heed of the disagreement among intel-
lectual historians about whether scholars can or should make causal claims
about the relationship between ideas and practices.260 With all these
caveats in mind, I nonetheless peculate (not prove) that what goes on in
the classroom has some ffect on the operation of law beyond the
classroom. This Part suggests that legal education indoctrinates new
lawyers with a set of ideas that make these lawyers more likely to embrace
criminal sanctions. The curricular model discussed in the previous two
Parts gives lawyers confidence in criminal law-and importantly, it
forestalls and discourages important critiques.
A. How Mass Incarceration Thinks
A central inquiry of this Essay is the relationship between ideas and
practices. How does a given way of thinking shape the choices we make
and the actions we take? The anthropologist Mary Douglas tackled this
issue in her short but influential book How Institutions Think.261 Douglas
argued that for an institution to survive, it must structure the thinking of
the individual humans who will participate in and perpetuate that
institution.262 People must come to view the institution as necessary and
natural.263 At the same time, to change or eliminate an institution, humans
must find a way to identify and then escape the conceptual categories that
the institution has imposed: "[T] he hope of intellectual independence is
258. See supra note 19; see also Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The
Politics of Mass Incarceration in America 10 (2006) (discussing the complex interaction of
different factors contributing to mass incarceration).
259. For example, since many convictions for drug offenses do not result in custodial
sentences, the War on Drugs probably played a more prominent role in driving up all crim-
inal convictions than it did in driving up the prisoner population specifically. See Alice
Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 563, 600 n.178 (2018)
[hereinafter Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry].
260. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American
Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1065, 1088-92
(1997) (contrasting different approaches to the question whether historians can develop
causal explanations).
261. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think 3 (1986).
262. Id. at 46 (noting that an institution needs "a parallel cognitive convention" to
succeed).
263. See id. at 46-47 ("[M]ost established institutions, if challenged, are able to rest
their claims to legitimacy on their fit with the nature of the universe.").
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to resist, and the necessary first step of resistance is to discover how the
institutional grip is laid upon our mind.""
Consider the most widely accepted accounts of the growth of prison
populations. Researchers have tested and rejected the hypothesis that
higher rates of criminal offending drove the prison expansion.26 5 Instead,
the increase in convictions and incarcerated people has been traced to
changes in policy and changes in legal practice.266 With regard to policy,
changes in sentencing law such as mandatory minimums, three-strikes
laws, and reductions or abolishment of parole have been identified as
significant contributors to the increase in people who are incarcerated.267
With regard to legal practice, prosecutors' decisions to pursue more severe
sentences are widely recognized, even as scholars disagree about the
relative importance of prosecutorial choices in relation to sentencing
policy.268 Notice that whatever the relative importance of these factors,
mass incarceration happened through law: through formal legal changes
with regard to sentencing, and through choices made in the legal process.
The carceral state was built in accordance with nullapoena sine lege, though
not quite in the sense that casebooks embrace that phrase.269 But we might
ask, why did people make these choices? Why did policymakers choose
more severe sentencing laws, and why did prosecutors seek more severe
sentences? As the carceral state grew, why was the legal profession so slow
to critique it?
It is difficult if not impossible to "prove" what any given human was
thinking, or to prove a link between an idea and an action. Intellectual
historians are right to raise caution about thinking we can read people's
minds and know why they acted as they did.270 But as criminal law scholars
264. Id. at 92. For a thoughtful deployment of Douglas's approach to the carceral state,
albeit without specific focus on legal education, see generally Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion
and Control in the Carceral State, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 259 (2011).
265. See, e.g., Nat'l Res. Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States 3
(Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) ("The best single proximate
explanation of the rise in incarceration is not rising crime rates, but the policy choices made
by legislators to greatly increase the use of imprisonment as a response to crime.").
266. Beckett, supra note 10, at 11 (" [S]hifts in policy and practice (rather than rising
crime rates) were the primary driver of penal expansion.").
267. See, e.g., Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in
Prison? 34 (2013) (identifying sentence length as a central factor).
268. See Pfaff, Locked In, supra note 185, at 11-15 ("The primary driver of incar-
ceration is increased prosecutorial toughness when it comes to charging people, not longer
sentences."). But see Beckett, supra note 10, at 16-20 (noting that "Pfaff is undoubtedly
correct to emphasize the role of prosecutors in the prison build-up," but offering evidence
to refute Pfaff's arguments that sentencing policy did not matter much).
269. That is, "no punishment without law" describes the means by which American
penal expansion took place-through legal forms that accommodated or even required the
expansion. Legality operated as the means to expand punishment, not as a constraint upon
it as promised by casebooks. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
270. See Fisher, supra note 260, at 1088-92 (considering capacity of dominant legal-
historical methodologies to address questions of causality).
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know, attributing thoughts to others and drawing conclusions about why
they acted as they did are the very coins of this legal realm. In the class-
room, we speculate freewheelingly about defendants' mens rea, sometimes
speaking as though mental states can be proved. When pushed, though,
criminal law scholars will acknowledge that in the rare case that actually
features a trial on mens rea issues, lawyers and factfinders usually must rely
on circumstantial evidence.21 So too must I.
Here, then, is the circumstantial evidence. A new framework for crim-
inal law pedagogy was developed at midcentury in the United States, one
that encouraged students-as-potential-policymakers to engage in critical
reflection on the law; it also offered an idealized model of what the law
could and should be.272 This new model recognized that criminal law was
a powerful and painful measure, but it also legitimized criminal law by
placing it in a framework of supposed constraints and identifying the law's
rational principles.273 And though the architects of this framework were
certainly concerned about the scope of existing substantive criminal
prohibitions, they did not choose to portray the wide range of those
prohibitions in their pedagogical model.274 Instead, they focused on
violent offenses and emphasized the importance of criminal law to address
gravely injurious behavior.275 The curricular model invited close scrutiny
of the minds and acts of criminal defendants, but it did not look closely at
the minds or acts of enforcement officials.276 Focused on the content of
criminal prohibitions and leaving all enforcement realities aside, the
model presented criminal law not only as a thing to be perfected but also
a thing to be trusted.
Soon thereafter, policymakers (who are disproportionately lawyers277)
began to allocate more money to law enforcement and add large numbers
of new law enforcement officials.278 And soon after that, policymakers and
prosecutors began a turn toward severity that has lasted several decades.279
To be sure, that turn was not directly encouraged by many members of the
271. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 Geo. L.J. 323, 377-
78 (2017) ("[P]rosecutors attempt to prove mens rea through the use of circumstantial evi-
dence and frequently must 'concoct' he defendant's level of intent to some degree.").
272. See supra Part I.
273. See supra sections ILA-B.
274. See supra section II.C.
275. See supra section II.C.
276. See supra section ID.
277. See Maimon Schwarzschild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal
Education Today, 17J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 3, 9 (2008) (noting that legislators are dispro-
portionately lawyers).
278. Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of
Mass Incarceration in America 1-4 (2016) (describing large increases in funding for law
enforcement beginning in the 1960s).
279. See Beckett, supra note 10, at 1 ("The U.S. incarceration rate began an unprece-
dented ascent in the 1970s.").
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legal academy, though nor was it much resisted for a long time. The poli-
cymakers, prosecutors, and judges who pursued or upheld more severe
sentences spoke the language of the criminal law canon, the same
language that pervaded the substantive law course that had been
introduced at midcentury.280 They emphasized the grave injuries inflicted
by criminals, and the ways that punishment would serve important ends of
desert, deterrence, and incapacitation.281 They put everything in a frame-
work of legality, where no one would be convicted without a prior law,
where each individual defendant would be duly charged and convicted
and sentenced, one at a time.282 And thus was built the carceral state, one
defendant at a time.
I have characterized the model of criminal law in the American
curriculum as "criminal law exceptionalism" to highlight the model's
claims about the distinctive burdens, distinctive subject matter, and dis-
tinctive mechanics of criminal law.283 Of course, every field of law might
claim to be different from others in various respects. But with the term
"exceptionalism," I mean to emphasize that teachers and scholars have
depicted criminal law as an exception to a general norm; they have
suggested that criminal law avoids or solves challenges that exist across all
of the rest of law. Exceptionalism is important to the story of how mass
incarceration thinks, first because it inoculates criminal institutions from
certain lines of critique, and second because it limits the scope of reform
proposals.284 For example, over the twentieth century, legal thinkers
increasingly recognized the inevitability of discretion in legal deci-
sionmaking, but in the specific field of criminal law, scholars continue to
depict discretion as a foreign, extralegal phenomenon.285 And to date,
280. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. Even the language of internal limits
to criminal law was alive and well as Americans built the carceral state, though usually used
in narrow contexts such as critiques of strict liability for regulatory offenses or burden-
shifting in affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart,Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 L. & Contemp. Probs. 401, 411 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Aims] (calling for substantive
constitutional limits on conduct that can be criminalized). Notwithstanding the limiting
principles featured prominently in criminal law casebooks, neither courts nor commenta-
tors were able to articulate concrete rules to restrict the definition of conduct as criminal.
Cf Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90J. Crim. L. & Criminology
109, 113 (1999) ("Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has
become meaningless.").
281. See supra section ILB.
282. See supra section IIA.
283. See supra note 12.
284. See Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at 2005-07 (explaining the effects
of exceptionalism on discourse surrounding mass incarceration).
285. See id. at 1989 ("Criminal law, the exceptional field, managed to resist these




most reform efforts consist of doubling down on the traditional model,
writing better statutes or reinvigorating supposed proof standards.286
None of this proves that the curriculum caused the penal expansion,
or that a different curriculum would have led to different results. Again,
mass incarceration is a complex phenomenon that defies a single-factor
explanation. It is possible that societal fear of crime, or racial mistrust and
prejudice, or economic inequality and the interests of the wealthier in
managing the poor, would have driven a similar expansion of American
criminal law no matter what the law professors were saying. But it is also
plausible that among all the various factors that made Americans with the
power to punish choose to do so more often and more severely, a confi-
dence in criminal law as a rational, necessary, and legitimate response to
grave injuries helped move things along. And it seems plausible that the
substantive criminal law course introduced at midcentury, designed to
bring dignity and respectability to the field, has fostered and encouraged
that confidence in the criminal law.
B. Student Resistance and Professorial Authority
Curricular indoctrination didn't work with everyone, to be sure. Some
students were probably paying only enough attention to survive the exam;
some probably slept through the course. And at least some who were
listening were sharply critical of the pedagogy. We have some record of
students' objections to the substantive criminal law course in a 1980 essay
by Sanford Kadish, structured as a dialogue between a Student and a
Professor.287 At the outset of his essay, Kadish explained that he wanted to
address criticisms of "substantive criminal law, as a course and as a subject
matter," that had been raised by students over the years.288 He noted that
he believed "these criticisms are widespread and ... my responses speak
to what is generally done in criminal law courses in this country. "289
Though this essay is now forty years old, the Student's criticisms will
sound painfully familiar to anyone who knows much about criminal law in
2020. Citing their experiences doing clinical work at a public defender's
office, the Student noted that the work of criminal defense attorneys in-
volves many efforts to exclude evidence on grounds of police misconduct
but no questions involving substantive criminal law.290 The Student noted
also that "[t]he discretionary judgments of officials pretty well undercut
the role of the substantive criminal law you are speaking about."291 Instead
286. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text (noting scholars' assurances that
better-drafted criminal codes would restore the ideal of legality in criminal law); see also
supra notes 106, 117 and accompanying text (discussing standards of proof).
287. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law, supra note 93.
288. Id. at 1.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1-2.
291. Id. at 5.
1690 [Vol. 120:1631
CARCERAL CURRICULUM
of "exquisite line drawings"292 on questions of supposed moral fault, the
Student wanted to discuss "the great issues of criminal law today-urban
crime and its relation to ghetto life; race and crime; the injustices in our
society that produce crime; the degradation of our prisons and jails;
corruption in government; the arrogance and brutality of police." 293 The
Student, it turns out, is an abolitionist: "Underlying all this talk is the
premise that punishing people is an acceptable and justifiable thing for
our society to do. I do not accept that premise."294
In response, the Professor repeated Herbert Wechsler's claim that
men rely on criminal law for protection against "all the deepest injuries
that human conduct can inflict. "295 He reassured the Student that in a few
rare cases, knowing "tricky mens rea issues" would be helpful.296 At the
same time, he said to focus only on "immediate practical training" would
be "a great waste and would make it doubtful whether we could justify
being part of a university."297 A substantive criminal law course could
provide general training in legal methods as well as an opportunity to
explore "the ramifications of a person's moral fault and responsibility."29
Even as defendants' moral faults needed to be explored, the Professor
explained, to discuss issues of race, corruption, and police brutality would
risk becoming "an exercise in ideological polemics."299 And to the
Student's charge that criminal law benefited "the well-to-do and the
powerful" while victimizing "the poor, the powerless, the outsider, [and]
racial and ethnic minorities," the Professor responded, "[Y]ou are
overreacting. "300 Though the Professor acknowledged and regretted race
and class disparities among defendants and prisoners, he emphasized that
"the cause of this is not in any meaningful sense the substantive criminal
law. "301
At the end of the essay, the Professor and the Student agree to
disagree.302 I suspect that Kadish's Student did not speak for all law
students of the 1980s, given what American lawyers did (and still do) to
keep criminal legal institutions operating. But I suspect also that criminal
law faculty may be substantially more sympathetic to the Student's arguments
292. Id. at 14.
293. Id. at 4.
294. Id. at 8.
295. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wechsler, The Challenge,
supra note 49, at 1097-98).
296. Id. at 2.
297. Id. at 3.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 4.
300. Id. at 9. The Professor also conceded that problems of "imperfections in admin-
istration" and excessive discretion exist but argued that the Student's distress over these
issues only showed the moral importance of substantive rules. See id. at 6, 8.




now than they were forty years ago.303 Reflecting on the half century of
mass incarceration, substantive criminal law teachers are left with two
unpleasant positions: What I teach doesn't matter, or what I teach does
matter-and look what it hath wrought. Either way, we need to do
something differently.
IV. PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE CRIMINAL LAW CANON
A. To Keep or Abandon the Criminal Law (Course)
In 1977, the law school that had launched the modern substantive
criminal law course installed a giant bronze sculpture by Jacques Lipchitz
called Bellerophon Taming Pegasus.304 In Greek myth, Bellerophon was a
mortal ordered by the gods to complete various near-impossible tasks,
including the capture of the winged horse.305 Lipchitz reportedly wanted
to depict Bellerophon's struggle as representative of "the control of laws
over the forces of disorder in society."3 06 But at the installation ceremony
at Columbia Law School, one professor looked at the great, swirling
twenty-three tons of wings and arms and hooves and told the New York
Times, "That looks like me trying to teach criminal law."307
Like a wearied Bellerophon, some law schools (including Columbia)
have since considered eliminating a course in substantive criminal law
from their required curriculum, and a few have actually done so.308 And if
the course is as flawed as this Essay suggests (or as meaningless as some
students have claimed), that option may seem appealing. Criminal law
could be left off the required curriculum altogether, as it was at many law
schools early in the twentieth century.309 Alternatively, schools could re-
quire a course in constitutional criminal procedure but no other criminal
law-related course.310
303. Kadish's casebook coauthor praised the Why Substantive Criminal Law essay as a
response to "undercurrents of cynicism and nihilism among our students." Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Kadish Returns, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 518, 519 (1982). Another leading casebook
author, Joshua Dressler, found Kadish's essay "resonated powerfully" and reported that he
recommended it to students who expressed concerns about his own criminal law course.
See Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 Clev. St. L. Rev. 409, 409 n.1 (1998).
304. Columbia Gets Lipchitz Sculpture, N.Y. Times (Apr. 20, 1977), https://www.ny




307. Id. The professor asked to remain anonymous.
308. See Balkin & Levinson, Legal Canons, supra note 232, at ix (noting that some law
schools have taken criminal law out of the required first-year curriculum and made it an
elective).
309. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
310. This is Georgetown's approach, where "Criminal Justice" is a required first-year
course that covers the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Full-Time J.D. Program, Geo. L.,
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Neither of these options seems wise. Now that we have built a carceral
state, one where criminal interventions are a central mode of governance
that structure the lives of many citizens, it would be rather ostrichlike for
law schools to simply stop talking about criminal law. And while
constitutional criminal procedure is an important topic, it is not one that
can be adequately understood without an account of the laws that give
police power in the first place.311 And that is what "substantive" criminal
laws are: authorizations to enforcement authorities to make various
interventions in the lives of citizens. They are not orders from the gods to
refrain from various types of conduct but human constructions that
empower some humans to impose burdens, stigma, or violence upon other
humans.
So long as our society relies so heavily on criminal law, we need a
course in it. But to teach this area of law, we need first an accurate account
of it. The problem with the existing course is not that there is nothing
there to teach, but that the conceptual model around which the course
was built was deeply flawed. It was a model designed to bring dignity to the
field, to secure criminal aw's place in the law school curriculum (and the
law school's place within the university), and to inspire legislative reform.
With those aims, the course was based on a vision of what criminal law
could and should be, in the eyes of Wechsler and Michael, and somewhat
later Kadish.312 But these men skipped a step, it seems: They apparently
did not consider whether they had an adequate understanding of what
criminal law was, or is. They seem to have taken for granted the
Blackstonian (or Benthamite) distinction between substance and pro-
cedure. They conceived of substantive criminal law as freestanding
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/j d-program/full-time-program
[https://perma.cc/GHQ4-FV2U] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). At most law schools, the same
constitutional material is covered in an upper-level elective called "Criminal Procedure."
See, e.g., Criminal Procedure: Investigations, Brook. L. Sch., https://www.brooklaw.edu/
Courses/Criminal-Procedure-Investigations [https://perma.cc/LBL6-GY8Z] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2020).
311. The interaction of substance and procedure was a central theme of William
Stuntz's work, which has earned a place of pride in the scholarly canon, though it has not
sufficiently influenced the pedagogical canon. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 1 (1996) (" [W]ithout
substantive limits, important parts of the law of criminal procedure seem likely to fall
apart."); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J.
393, 415 (1995) (noting that in early America, "[P]rocedure and substance were
inseparable"). As I have argued elsewhere, Stuntz's important insights into the interactions
of procedure and substance did not ultimately lead him to question that conceptual dichot-
omy. See Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1555, 1587-90 (2015) [hereinafter Ristroph, Regula-
tion or Resistance]. Accordingly, the casebook that Stuntz coauthored does not go far
enough in resisting the Wechslerian model, though Stuntz's casebook is probably the best
option now on the market.
312. See supra Part I.
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prohibitions of conduct, and the course became a study in the best
formulation of those prohibitions.
It is time to develop a more honest criminal law theory, one that
begins with a more accurate description of criminal law as a human prac-
tice. Since I have gestured toward Kant, and he toward metaphysics as
science, I should make clear that my approach is not Kantian, metaphysi-
cal, or particularly scientific.313 I do, however, seek to develop a positive
description of criminal law rather than an ideal theory. I am certainly not
hostile to normativity; indeed, I think it inescapable. We cannot avoid
making choices as we decide how to describe the world around us, and
whether we realize we are doing it or not, we inevitably rely on normative
judgments or intuitions in making those choices. All the same, as philoso-
phers have long realized, theory begins with observation, not with
imagination.314 We should first say what we see, remembering always to
consider the possibility that we are not seeing clearly. Moreover, insofar as
conceptual models involve generalizations that may not seem apt in every
particular case, we should aim for a theory that does fit most of the
observed phenomena that humans label criminal law.315 A theory that
describes a practice that has never existed is not a good basis for an
introductory course in criminal law.
B. Criminal Law as Human Practice
What is criminal law? The reader still with me at this point may not
have the patience for a full account, and in any event a full account would
exceed the conventional length of a law review essay. But I can sketch here
an overview in the form of six propositions, each of which I have
elaborated more fully elsewhere. Again, I mean this to be a description of
criminal law, not an aspiration for what it might become. And I mean it to
be a conceptual account that is roughly accurate across most jurisdictions
313. See generally Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will
Be Able to Come Forward as Science (Paul Carus trans., 1977) (1783). Science, of course,
was the paradigm for many nineteenth and early twentieth century legal scholars. See
Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1928)
(noting the need for a "prolegomena to a criminal procedure more scientific than that
under which society now is so ineffectively waging the struggle against crime").
314. See Michael Oakeshott, What Is Political Theory?, in What Is History? And Other
Essays 391, 393 (Luke O'Sullivan ed., 2004) (suggesting an etymological link between theory
and theater, with both words related to the Greek thea for an observed spectacle or
occurrence); Stephen K. White, Pluralism, Platitudes, and Paradoxes: Fifty Years of Western
Political Thought, 30 Pol. Theory 472, 477 (2002) (linking theory to seeing and describing
"the activity of the theorist [as] the solitary act of grasping an object within a field of vision").
315. This conception of "fit" is fairly standard in legal theory and beyond. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 535, 537-
38 (1999) (distinguishing between text-based constitutional theories that focus solely on the
written text and "practice-based theories [that] assert their superiority because they better




and, with one exception noted below, historical periods. It is not meant to
model only American criminal law in the twenty-first century, though I do
think the account will help us better understand criminal law here and
now. It is useful to try to identify aspects of criminal law that span place
and time, for that will help us assess whether present conditions are
normal, and what we could reasonably hope to change. In the remainder
of this Part, I first state the propositions, then offer a brief account of each.
* Criminal law is human law.
* Criminal law empowers state officials to use a particular enforce-
ment mechanism: a criminal sanction.
* Criminal sanctions involve a state-imposed inequality: They alter
the convicted person's formal status within the political
community.
* Although the criminal sanction is an important distinguishing
characteristic, criminal law cannot be reduced to punishment.
(Here I do focus on contemporary law specifically. Modern states
have developed a distinctive and elaborate enforcement apparatus
that generates not-necessarily-punitive powers, such as powers of
surveillance and investigation.)
* Criminal law has no fixed substance; criminal sanctions can be
(and are) used in nearly every area in which law regulates at all.
* Nor does criminal law have a fixed purpose. No single statement
of purpose captures all or most of the circumstances in which
states do in fact choose to use criminal sanctions.
1. Criminal law is human law. - I begin with the proposition that crim-
inal law is law, so we need some underlying jurisprudential understanding
to make sense of criminal law. And without wading too far into the what-
is-law swamp, I posit that law is a human practice distinguishable from, say,
morality, religion, language, game-playing, or other human endeavors that
may bear some similarity to law or overlap with it.316 One distinguishing
feature of law-at least, the kind of law of interest here-is that it operates
through states. Unlike, say, divine law or the laws of physics, human laws
are constructed by states and used by them. Moreover, states themselves
are human institutions. Whatever the state does, it does through human
agents. Criminal law is neither self-evident nor self-executing: It needs
human agents to articulate and enact it, and it needs human agents to
interpret and enforce it.317 Unlike Bellerophon, who received a golden
bridle from Athena to help him tame Pegasus,318 we mortals must make
criminal laws on our own.
316. For a more extensive treatment of the what-is-law question, see Alice Ristroph,
Sovereignty and Subversion, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029, 1049-53 (2015).
317. For a more detailed account of criminal law as law by and for humans, see generally
Ristroph, Criminal Law for Humans, supra note 33.
318. N.J. Spyropoulos, Bellerophon 20 (Clarence A. Manning trans. 1955).
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As a human practice, law relies heavily upon human language. We use
language to articulate the powers of state officials and the conditions
under which their powers will be exercised. But if human language does
not always allow us to fix meaning clearly, if language is subject to inter-
pretation or manipulation, or if it evolves with time, then law will be
subject to the same limitations.319
And finally, we should expect all the faculties and frailties that
humans possess to show up in legal practice. If humans are only boundedly
rational, so too will be their law. If humans engage in motivated reasoning
or make decisions subject to various cognitive biases-including but not
limited to implicit racial bias-the law will reflect such limitations.320 To
be sure, an enduring aim of the humans who construct law is to build
institutions better than themselves, to design institutions that will correct
for or guard against human failings. But the effort to overcome our own
human limitations is itself a human effort, and we should never assume it
to have succeeded.
2. Criminal law empowers state officials to use a particular enforcement
mechanism: the criminal sanction. - This proposition actually encompasses
two important claims, but they are sufficiently closely linked that I have
stated them as one proposition. The first claim is that criminal law empow-
ers state officials. That is, criminal law is power-conferring law, not a set of
freestanding directives to private individuals.321 Contrary to the canonical
319. Here it is difficult to improve upon James Madison:
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed
on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are . . . more or less obscure
and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a
serious of particular discussions and adjudications . . . . [N]o language is
so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas ....
When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
The Federalist No. 37, at 182-83 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
320. This point is a recurring theme in critical race theorists' critiques of substantive
criminal law. See, e.g., Lee, Reasonable Man, supra note 206, at 4 (arguing that social norms
involving race affect legal decisionmakers in the criminal law context); Armour, supra note
120, at 205 (" [U] nder current law biased moral judgments of a wrongdoer can directly and
indirectly determine whether factfinders 'find' the necessary mens rea for criminal con-
viction."); Capers, supra note 216, at 1363-64 (concluding that "implicit biases about race"
can affect the "prosecution and resolution of rape cases"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood
and Crime, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 95, 97 (1993) ("The law compels and legitimates prevailing
relationships of power.").
321. Legal theorists have emphasized the fact that law does not operate merely by im-
posing constraints but also by conferring new powers in some instances, as when law enables
individuals to contract, bequeath property, or marry. Law may confer powers on either
private individuals or public officials. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27-33 (2d ed.
1994). Law's power-conferring function has not been sufficiently explored with regard to
criminal law, which is typically portrayed (including by Hart himself) only in terms of
constraints. See id. at 27. But see Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
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account developed midcentury, criminal law does not consist of statements
such as "do not murder, rape, or rob."322 Instead, criminal aws empower
state officials to act in particular ways, which leads to the second part of
this proposition: Criminal laws empower officials to impose a distinctive
sanction. I say more about criminal sanctions below, but let me first
illustrate this important aspect of the structure of criminal law. "Thou shalt
not kill" is a divine commandment, a prohibition addressed to the individual;
it does not contemplate any enforcement mechanism (perhaps because
the giver of the commandment can take care of enforcement Himself or
Herself). "Whoever shall intentionally cause the death of another person
is guilty of murder and shall be subject to life in prison" is a criminal law.323
It takes a different form than the divine commandment; it needs a human
enforcer and thus it empowers and directs that enforcer.
In emphasizing the conferral of enforcement powers, I do not mean
to obscure the norm-articulation function of criminal law.324 But it is
important to remember that many kinds of law, and also many nonlegal
human practices, involve the articulation of norms for human conduct.
Criminal law involves a distinctive kind of norm-articulation in which
violations of the norm are subject to a state-imposed sanction.
3. Criminal sanctions involve state-imposed inequality. - It is difficult to
associate criminal law with one specific penalty, since at different times a
variety of unpleasant burdens have been used as criminal sanctions. Prison
and death may come to mind most readily, but noncustodial sanctions
such as fines or probation are actually more common today.325 Earlier eras
saw banishment or public shaming (such as the stocks) as common
criminal sanctions.326 But there is some continuity across different types of
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo L.J. 185, 199-
200 (1983) (discussing rules of criminal procedure as allocations of power). For an account
of criminal statutes as power-conferring law, see Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note
12, at 1983-84. Elsewhere, I have argued that the principle of legality itself confers power
more than it constrains: In practice, "[D]o not impose criminal sanctions unless there is a
valid statute" has become "to impose criminal sanctions, simply enact a statute or adapt an
existing one." See Ristroph, Definitive Article, supra note 33, at 148-49.
322. See Hart, Aims, supra note 280, at 403 ("Mostly, the commands of the criminal law
are 'must-nots,' or prohibitions, which can be satisfied by inaction. 'Do not murder, rape,
or rob.' But some of them are 'musts,' or affirmative requirements . . . . File your income
tax return."').
323. This is a simplification of a fairly standard formulation. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-1105 (2020).
324. See, e.g., Farmer, supra note 44, at 26 ("[T]he aims of the criminal law ... are
broader in scope than simply the justification of punishment . . . . Criminal law . .. may be
expressive, or even constitutive, of the prevailing social morality adopted by the state .... ").
325. See Sally T. Hillsman,Joyce L. Sichel & Barry Mahoney, DOJ, Fines in Sentencing:
A Study of the Use of the Fine as a Criminal Sanction 7-9 (1984); Joan Petersilia, Probation
in the United States, 22 Crime &Just. 149, 149 (1997).
326. On banishment, see J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800, at
500-06 (1986). On forms of public shaming such as stocks, see Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth
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criminal penalties. As many scholars have observed, a distinctive stigma
attaches to a criminal conviction and accompanies all forms of criminal
sanction-or perhaps stigma itself is part of the sanction.327 The
combination of the stigma and the specific form of penalty is a state-
imposed inequality: The convicted person is subject to burdens that other
citizens are not, and these burdens are associated with a loss of political
standing. Some penalties, like a death sentence or banishment, make the
loss of standing quite explicit. But even seemingly milder penalties such as
a fine or community supervision involve an alteration in the convicted per-
son's status.32 In American criminal law today, the so-called "collateral"
consequences of a criminal conviction are good indicators of this loss of
status.329 In short, criminal law is a particular way in which the state
imposes inequality: It designates some persons as "criminals" and thereby
deprives them of some of the goods that members of a polity not so desig-
nated enjoy-physical liberty, money, equal dignity and social standing,
various civil and political rights, eligibility for various government benefits,
and so forth.330
The description of criminal sanctions as state-imposed inequality may
meet resistance from normative theorists who have offered justifications of
punishment as a supposedly egalitarian measure. On one such account, a
crime disrupts an equilibrium among citizens and puts the offender at an
advantage over everyone else; punishment then restores equality and en-
sures "fair play. "331 I have critiqued these theories at length in other work,
but even those who endorse the fair-play view should, upon reflection, be
able to recognize punishment as state-imposed inequality.332 Punishment
does treat the offender differently from those who are not punished by
imposing "harsh treatment"; it is precisely that worse treatment that the
theorist is trying to explain andjustify by construing the crime as disruptive
to a baseline of equality. We can leave aside for now the question of
Amendment's Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 405, 438-39 (2016).
327. Hart, Aims, supra note 280, at 404-05.
328. The alteration in status is usually permanent, but my theory does not require such
permanence. An effective expungement and total erasure of a criminal record could in
theory restore someone to full political membership and equal status. In practice, criminal
records are nearly impossible to escape. See generallyJames B.Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal
Record (2015) (discussing the difficulties encountered by individuals with criminal records
in their personal and professional lives).
329. For a more detailed exposition of this account discussing the detrimental impacts
that the "felon" label has on one's standing in the community, see generally Ristroph,
Farewell to the Felonry, supra note 259.
330. See id. at 605.
331. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475, 477-80 (1968),
reprinted in Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral
Psychology 31, 33-36 (1976).
332. See Ristroph,Just Violence, supra note 140, at 1045-46 (noting that the normative,
fair-play view of punishment fails to consider that many criminals enjoy little economic or
social equality to begin with).
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whether punishment is justified inequality, and simply recognize that it is
an imposition of inequality. (Indeed, the fact that criminal law combines
impositions of inequality with claims of moral justification may make it a
distinctively dangerous human practice, one that Donald Dripps has called
"a recipe for irresponsibility-a political martini of four parts violence and
one part of self-righteousness."333)
Although the imposition of inequality is a feature of criminal law
across jurisdictions, nowhere is this aspect of criminal law starker than in
the United States. In this country, criminal law has been used to enforce
racial inequality throughout our history, and that history should shape any
American criminal law course. Critical race theorists have made this point
about the entire legal curriculum: Race is not peripheral to American law,
and it is not an issue that can be relegated to electives or addressed only
optionally.334 But this argument has particular force with regard to crimi-
nal law, a field intrinsically about impositions of inequality.
4. Criminal law cannot be reduced to punishment. - Criminal law
empowers state officials to do more than impose whatever formal sanction
is authorized. At least since the nineteenth century, states have assigned
particular public officials the tasks of identifying, investigating, and
prosecuting crime.335 This means that any new designation of conduct as
criminal will give state officials, including police officers, new authorities
333. Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a "Regulatory Model"
of, or "Pathological Perspective" on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 199, 204 (1996).
334. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously: Getting Beyond the Num-
bers, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 3-5 (2006) ("Law schools at the very least must ensure that race-
based discussions are incorporated into their classrooms."); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw,
Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 Nat'l Black L.J. 1, 2-
3, 9-10 (1988) ("Although it is clear that many discussions do not involve race, it is also true
that race is often implicated in a range of ways even when it is not directly at issue and when
racial perspectives are not explicitly identified.").
335. Before that time, private enforcement was much more important, at least in Anglo-
American legal systems. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution
Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 411, 421 (2009) (" [T]he English tradition
of private prosecution dominated the early American experience before the Revolution.");
James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland's Actio Popularis, 66 Duke L.J.
1493, 1527 (2017) (noting that, in Scotland, "private enforcement of criminal law had
largely ended by the nineteenth century").
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to try to discover and prevent that conduct.336 Criminal law also contem-
plates a distinctive adjudicative process that empowers state officials to take
persons into custody even before conviction.337
To say that criminal law cannot be reduced to punishment allows us
to recognize police authority as part of criminal law, but it also invites us
to consider ways in which public officials use the powers bestowed by
criminal law for purposes other than prosecution and conviction. For
example, in various periods, vagrancy laws were understood to authorize
police to move people along-to order them out of specific areas.33 Even
when a person was actually charged with vagrancy and brought to court,
in many cases the disposition was not a conviction but an agreement hat
the defendant would leave the area and not return.339 Used in this way, a
criminal prohibition of vagrancy was not primarily aimed at formal
punishment, but at managing populations and people in physical space.340
Several scholars have examined similar "managerial" functions of criminal
336. Some investigative powers are distinct to criminal enforcement. For example, the
power to stop and frisk an individual is-in principle-contingent on suspicion of criminal
activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that when an officer suspects criminal
activity "and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently danger-
ous ... he is entitled ... to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used"). But other investigative
powers cross the civil/criminal line, and indeed, in some cases, police officers are the
designated agents of civil enforcement. As is now widely acknowledged, police authority to
enforce civil traffic and automobile regulations-including through automobile stops-
dramatically expands the opportunities for criminal investigation. See Sarah A. Seo, Policing
the Open Road, supra note 34, at 109-10 (detailing the ways in which police officers' roles
in traffic enforcement and criminal investigations overlap).
337. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 343-45, 353-54 (2001) (discussing
history and current practice of police authority to arrest and concluding that a custodial
arrest-even for an offense punishable only by fine-does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
338. See, e.g., Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 603, 605 (1956) ("A number of defendants [arrested for vagrancy] were discharged
with orders to get out of Philadelphia or to get out of the particular section of Philadelphia
where they were arrested.").
339. See Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of CriminalJustice: Philadelphia, 1800-
1880, at 29-31 (1989). To be sure, elsewhere in the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
vagrancy laws were used for the precise purpose of securing convictions; many states relied
heavily on vagrancy to generate convicts for the convict-leasing system that replaced slavery
in the American South. See generally Blackmon, supra note 176 (discussing convict leasing
after the Civil War).
340. Anti-loitering laws now sometimes give police specific authority to issue similar
dispersal orders. For this reason, such laws do not really present he lack-of-notice complaint
that has sometimes been lodged against them. Such laws may be objectionable for other
reasons, but they do not impose criminal sanctions without a very specific and indeed
personalized notice. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Extremely Broad Laws, 61 Ariz. L. Rev. 641,




investigation and adjudication, both on the streets and in the courts.341 A
theory of criminal law needs to be able to capture these functions as well
as the more familiar imposition of penalties for specified conduct.
5. Criminal law has no fixed substance. - Much of what I have said above
will be seen, from the perspective of the existing canon, as observations
about "procedure" rather than "substance." But as should be clear by now,
I think that conceptual separation gravely distorts our understanding of
criminal law.342 Since criminal law is defined in part by its enforcement
mechanisms, we must attend to enforcement to understand this area of
law. The substance of what is actually prosecuted and punished will always
depend on what enforcers do. If they decline to enforce, a statute will not
enforce itself. If state agents interpret written statutes in unexpected ways,
the "substance" of the criminal law is thus altered. And as I have suggested
above, as we watch substance take shape through actual enforcement
procedures, we must keep in mind that criminal law's enforcers are, like
all law enforcement, humans. Human judgment, human error, and
human bias are inevitably part of enforcement practices.343
All the same, even as I resist a substance/procedure distinction that
leaves enforcement out of an account of criminal law, I think there is value
in studying the content of criminal statutes, or other forms of law that set
341. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan.
L. Rev. 611, 614 (2014) (introducing a "managerial model" that is more concerned with
"managing people over time through engagement with the criminal justice system" than
with "adjudicating guilt and punishment in specific cases"); see also Bernard E. Harcourt,
Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing 129-34 (2001) (discussing
"order-maintenance policing" as itself a way of constructing the meaning of "order").
342. For more detailed discussions of this point, see Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra
note 12, at 2008-09; Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance, supra note 311, at 1587-90;
Ristroph, Thin Blue Line, supra note 33, at 308-14. Consider also Herbert Packer's review
of the first edition of Sanford Kadish's casebook:
[T]hey might have chosen another path. They might have attempted the
task that no one else has so far been either wise enough or foolish enough
to undertake: to fuse, somehow, substance and process into a meaningful
whole; to expose for examination the interplay of rules and institutions
that characterizes and limits the criminal sanction, both as it is and as we
might wish it to be. Only through such a synthesis are we likely to provide
the resources required for resolution of the paradoxes of the criminal law.
Packer, supra note 75, at 794.
343. The role of bias in police decisions is increasingly widely acknowledged. See, e.g.,
Butler, The System Is Working, supra note 191, at 1447-48 ("[T]he Supreme Court ha[s]
established a set of police practices that, in theory, apply to everyone, but are principally
directed against black men."); Carbado, supra note 192, at 964-67 (describing the severe
burden that racialization of Fourth Amendment doctrine places on people of color in
interactions with people). But legislators, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and other legal actors
are no less vulnerable to cognitive bias or other sources of error. See, e.g., Armour, supra
note 120, at 204 ("[I]f black wrongdoers systematically suffer harsher moral evaluations
than similarly situated whites, they will more often satisfy the mens rea requirement for
criminal conviction, which means that black criminals are 'constructed' and not merely
'found' in the bias-laden fact 'finding' process of a criminal trial .... ").
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forth conditions of criminal liability. It is useful to try to catalogue the
kinds of conduct that are designated as subject to criminal sanctions, if
only to discover the difficulty of capturing everything.344 It is true that most
societies have criminalized acts of physical violence and incursion on
property interests, but what counts as violence, or property, changes over
place and time.345 Moreover, criminal laws have long been used to reach
conduct far beyond physical violence; they have often been used to punish
a wide range of activities (and people) found annoying, dangerous, or
threatening. Socrates was convicted for corrupting the youth of Athens,
Sarah Good and other colonial women for witchcraft, Homer Plessy for
riding in the wrong railway car, and Estelle Griswold for distributing
contraceptives.346 That many commentators would today view each of
those convictions as a misuse of criminal law shows only that judgments
about what should be criminalized have changed, not that there is a true
core of criminal law's substance.
To say that criminal law has no fixed substance is not to deny that it
has, at least in the United States, a typical structure. The categories of mens
rea and actus reus, the defining of crimes in terms of elements, and the
concept of legal proof are important to the contemporary analysis of
criminal liability. But in teaching students how these concepts operate in
the practice of criminal law, honesty is key. For example, elements of
crimes are less important when trial is too costly for many defendants and
the pressure to plead is overwhelming.347 Even when cases do go to a trial,
mental states are attributed to defendants by ex post decisionmakers; they
are not facts that prosecutors could or do prove with scientific certainty.34
6. Criminal law has no fixed purpose. - States use criminal sanctions,
and other interventions such as policing, for a wide range of purposes.
Surely the four horsemen of criminal law casebooks-retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-do motivate some legislators,
judges, and other decisionmakers, but no one of these purposes appears
to eclipse the others. At different times one rationale or another may dom-
inate public discourse. Moreover, in some instances criminal interventions
appear motivated by purposes unrelated to any of the four punishment
344. Blackstone's Commentaries may give us the first effort to classify all criminal
offenses into rational categories. As Lindsay Farmer notes, Blackstone identified broad cat-
egories such as "public wrong," "crimes against the person," "crimes against property," and
"crimes against religion." Farmer, supra note 44, at 72. But there were still a great many
offenses that didn't fit into Blackstone's scheme, so he used "public police" as a residual
category for such matters as "bigamy, Egyptians, common nuisances, idle and incorrigible
rogues, sumptuary laws, gaming, and poaching." Id. at 73.
345. See id. at 32-33, 65, 231-32. I discuss shifts in the conception of violent crime in
Ristroph, Shadow of Violence, supra note 169, at 574 ("As the scope of the criminal law and
the scale of imprisonment has expanded, so too has the concept of violence.").
346. For further discussion of these examples, see generally Ristroph, Intellectual
History, supra note 12, at 1964-65.
347. See supra notes 5-6.
348. See supra notes 106, 117.
1702 [Vol. 120:1631
CARCERAL CURRICULUM
theories typically recited in casebooks, as two very different uses of
vagrancy law illustrate. As discussed above, in some contexts, vagrancy laws
were used simply to move undesirable people out of town; in others, they
were used to supply southern industrial interests with captive labor after
chattel slavery was no longer legally authorized.349
My claim is that criminal law itself does not have a single overriding
purpose, not that individual humans do not act with purpose. As should
be clear, the various humans who authorize and implement criminal
sanctions will typically be able to give reasons for their actions, though they
may not all give the same reasons. But I suspect it is not possible to give a
non-tautological statement of purpose that captures all or most instances
of criminal law. I have written, for example, that "[t] he criminal law aims
to make criminals."350 My emphasis there was the fact that criminal law
operates on people, not acts, and it transforms the status of a convicted
person in rendering them a criminal. But could the making of criminals
be taken as criminal law's general purpose in most instances? I am not
sure. I would guess that at least sometimes, those who enact a criminal
statute may hope or even expect that the mere enactment of the law will
produce perfect compliance. In such a case, the legislator does not aim to
make criminals but simply to change behavior. Moreover, for any single
given criminal statute, the purposes of a legislator may not align with those
of the prosecutor nor yet again the sentencing judge. The bottom line is
that associating criminal law with one overarching purpose is likely to
cloud, rather than clarify, our understanding of actual human practices.
C. Education and the Capacity to Resist
With those six propositions, we could revise the canons of criminal
law. Some efforts to revise the scholarly canon have begun, though much
remains to be done.3 1 The curricular canon, however, remains mired in
criminal law exceptionalism, a deeply flawed account of what criminal law
is. In trying to define criminal law as a distinctive field, scholars and teach-
ers have focused on its substance, its purposes, and its enforcement
mechanism. As should be clear, neither "substance"-understood as the
types of conduct that are subjected to liability-nor purposes are in fact
consistent across all criminal laws nor characteristically distinguishable
349. See supra notes 176, 339 and accompanying text.
350. Ristroph, Definitive Article, supra note 33, at 162.
351. As evidenced by footnotes above, various individual scholars have articulated
arguments in line with some of the specific propositions I outline above. Overall, though,
the most prevalent scholarly critiques of American criminal law still rely on roughly the same
model of criminal law as depicted in American casebooks, and thus they see problems such
as racial disparities and severity as "pathologies" or "excess" rather than fundamental
attributes of criminal law. For a critique along these lines, see Amna Akbar, Radical Reimag-
ination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 442-43 (2018) (noting that scholarly critiques of
existing criminal legal institutions depict the problem as one of "contemporary excess,"
neglecting criminal law's history and treating criminal law itself as a neutral institution).
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from civil laws. But criminal law does impose unique burdens and a
distinctive enforcement mechanism. The subject belongs in the law school
curriculum and is an important object of scholarly inquiry.
Would a course built around this alternative account of criminal law
have made mass incarceration less likely? Would it help us unwind mass
incarceration now? My alternative account is likely to produce a more
chastened approach to the choice to use criminal sanctions, but it does
not guarantee such restraint. Various portions of my account are con-
sistent with some academic conceptions of criminal law held in the early
twentieth century, before Michael and Wechsler developed their vision.
The thinkers who held that pre-Wechslerian view were no abolitionists, nor
even penal minimalists. Most notably, Thurman Arnold, a Yale law
professor of the 1930s who would later serve in the Roosevelt
Administration, criticized the substance/procedure dichotomy in ways
consonant with my arguments here, and he emphasized the inability of
"substantive" law to contain enforcement discretion.352 He repeatedly
emphasized the role of state agents and resisted a conception of
substantive law as depersonalized and self-executing.353 But Arnold did not
appear particularly troubled by any of these features of criminal law; he
saw enforcement discretion as an efficient way to achieve the public
good.354
If we revise our criminal law canons to understand criminal law as a
human practice, then our willingness to use criminal sanctions is likely to
turn on how much we trust the enforcers. Arnold was sanguine, but almost
a century later, we have good reason to be less confident. Among other
things, we have better understandings of cognitive bias, and the ways that
bias is likely to affect the exercise of discretion are simply too prevalent
now to ignore. And in an age of both great inequality and heightened
awareness of inequality, empowering the state to impose still more
inequality may seem more troubling than it did early in the twentieth
century.
A different curriculum would better serve the general aim to prepare
students for democratic citizenship and empower students with a more
352. Thurman W. Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617, 645 (1932) ("Substantive law is canonized procedure. Proce-
dure is unfrocked substantive law."); see also Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An
Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 Yale L.J. 1, 6 (1932) [hereinafter Arnold, Law Enforcement]
(rejecting as false the idea that "criminal justice is both impartial and impersonal-that
principles instead of personal discretion control the actions ofjudges and prosecutors").
353. See Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 352, at 6-7; see also Arnold, Criminal
Attempts, supra note 210, at 76-79 ("An examination of the cases indicates not only that
courts are free to throw all this machinery overboard, but that they are actually doing it in
most cases.").
354. See Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 210, at 79 (claiming that attempt law's




critical perspective to assess the merits of criminal sanctions.55 To be clear,
though, the aim should be to equip students with the capacity to critique
and resist existing legal institutions; it should not be to replace one line of
indoctrination with another. There will be those who, like modern-day
Thurman Arnolds, see the realities of criminal law and embrace it anyway.
A democratic society needs disagreement and can benefit from it, so long
as those who disagree share some understanding of the underlying facts.
The problem with criminal law teaching is that it has produced consensus
through a distorted depiction of criminal legal practices.
Ultimately, though, we need a different curriculum, whether or not it
yields different criminal legal practices or leads to more democratic modes
of interaction.3 56 Obviously, one aim of education is knowledge and
understanding. The existing criminal law curriculum was designed around
other goals: It sought to secure esteem for the field and implement a
particular policy vision.357 If for no other reason than the pursuit of truth
for its own sake, teachers should abandon Wechsler's model in favor of a
more accurate description of criminal law as a human practice.
355. C. Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Socratic Method in the Age of Trauma, 130 Harv. L.
Rev. 2320, 2341 (2017) (" [T]eaching is meant to form citizens of a democracy. A classroom
can model how citizens speak to each other and discover their rational and meaningful
disagreements.").
356. C. Simon, Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 139, at 1335. As Simon puts it:
I view my course as a practical exercise in creating a mentality for the next
gener-ation of lawyers. By helping students become aware of the role that
historically specific narratives and discourses play in making it possible to
legally reason about crime, I hope my course teaches them to work with
the multiple sources of meaning and authority that compete in our
present age. Naturally this makes it more difficult to engage in the project
of reforming the criminal law by identifying its principles and seeking to
work out implications for various boundary-drawing problems. But we are
not in an age when academic legal scholars have much influence on the
making of criminal law. Instead we must make our contribution, if any, in
the preparation of new criminal law mentalities.
Id.
357. If the prevailing account of criminal law was shaped by concerns about the field in
relation to the rest of law, and by efforts to identify a distinctive subject worthy of inde-
pendent attention, this is hardly a new story. Similar stories have been told of torts and
evidence. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1226-27 (2001);
William Twining, Hot Air in the Redwoods, A Sequel to the Wind in the Willows, 86 Mich.
L. Rev. 1523, 1533-36 (1988). Indeed, scholarly accounts of law itself are often implicitly,
and sometimes explicitly, driven by the theorist's own felt need to maintain "the dignity of
our profession." See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism,
73 Cornell L. Rev. 335, 335-39 (1988) (describing a view he calls "conventionalist," and
explaining that he adheres to that view because he finds the alternatives to imperil "the
dignity of our profession"). As I note, law doesn't execute itself; it needs humans to do that.
Nor does law theorize itself; it needs humans to do that too. See supra section IV.B.1. It





The phrase "the carceral state" appears to have originated with a
political scientist, which is not surprising: The term reflects a shift in the
use of criminal law so profound that the very character of the political
regime is altered.358 For many Americans, criminal legal institutions are
the "only government I know." 359 For a still-larger number, the burdens of
a criminal record define their place in the polity.360 Meanwhile, for many
Americans whose lives have not been burdened by a criminal conviction,
the operation of criminal law is seen as one of the state's most fundamental
tasks, more important than the pursuit of economic well-being, education,
technological advancement, or even liberty itself. 361
Historical transformations as significant as America's twentieth
century turn toward carcerality do not happen thoughtlessly. Humans may
not always be fully rational, but they are nonetheless thinking creatures
who give accounts of why they are acting as they do. And, in general,
humans do not openly embrace malevolence toward one another. Rather,
large-scale violence by some against others is usually accompanied by a
theory or rationale, often held in good faith, about why the violence is
358. See Gottschalk, The Prison State, supra note 20, at 1-2 (describing how the carceral
state "includes not only the country's vast archipelago ofjails and prisons, but also the far-
reaching and growing range of penal punishments and controls that lies in the never-never
land between the prison gate and full citizenship"); see also Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in
Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral State, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 235, 235 (2008)
("The carceral state has grown so huge that it has begun to transform fundamental
democratic institutions .... "). The phrase evokes Michel Foucault's concept of "the car-
ceral archipelago," or a society that disciplines through both the prison itself and other
institutions (such as schools, factories, and the military) organized on similar principles. See
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 297 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1977) (describing "a whole series of institutions which, well
beyond the frontiers of criminal law, constituted what one might call the carceral
archipelago").
359. Vesla M. Weaver, The Only Government I Know: How the Criminal Justice System
Degrades Democratic Citizenship, Bos. Rev. (June 10, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/us/
vesla-m-weaver-citizenship-custodial-state-incarceration [https://perma.cc/7LEH-AEAY].
360. See Jacobs, supra note 328, at 247 ("Th[e] conception of the convicted felon as a
noncitizen carried over into U.S. law, particularly with respect o prisoners, who were treated
as 'beyond the ken of the courts.' Even persons who had completed their sentences were
denied certain citizenship rights." (quoting Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506, 506 (1963))).
361. See, e.g., Hart, Aims, supra note 280, at 410 (" [T]he criminal law has an obviously
significant and, indeed, a fundamental role to play in the effort to create the good society.").
As a few scholars have suggested, the crime victim has become the cultural model of the
representative citizen. See David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order
in Contemporary Society 144 (2001) (viewing a victim as a "representative character");
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 136 (2007) ("The crime victim can be
celebrated in American governance as an ideal citizen subject in part because his or her




appropriate. The conquest of indigenous tribes in the United States had a
theory, as did the institution of slavery, and as did and do any number of
uses of military force.3 62 Mass incarceration was not a thoughtless mistake.
It was not consciously theorized in terms of scale, to be sure; I see no
evidence that leaders or policymakers set out to become the world leader
in prison population. As James Comey reminds us, mass incarceration
happened one defendant at a time.363 But there is a particular vision of
criminal law that made millions of criminal prosecutions seem, when each
was considered individually, like a good idea. That is the vision of a noble,
impartial, and constrained criminal law, and it is a mirage. The hope now
must be to try to see-and help the next generation of lawyers see-more
clearly.
362. See, e.g., Seth Davis, American Colonialism and Constitutional Redemption, 105
Calif. L. Rev. 1751, 1775-77 (2017) (discussing the relationship between Spanish theologian
Francisco de Vitoria's theories of just conquest and the Supreme Court's endorsement of
forcible conquest of native tribes); Ristroph, Just Violence, supra note 140, at 1028 & n.40
(discussing just war theory); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American
Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1,
41-44 (2014) (discussing the political thought ofJohn C. Calhoun and its influence in slave-
holding states).
363. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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